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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
Political parties play a prominent part in the 
functioning of democratic societies, for they act as 
one of the chief sources for the aggregation of the 
people's interests, organize elections, run candidates, 
provide for a peaceful transfer of political power and 
help to organize the formal government. Consequently, 
the importance of studying political parties is noted 
by many authorities. Avery Leiserson, for example, a 
generally recognized authority on political parties, 
states that parties provide a major link between the 
people and government, between separate formal agencies 
and government officials, and between official and non­
official holders of power. He shows that parties cut 
across the study of the conventional processes of gov- 
ernment: the administrative, electoral, legislative, 
executive, and, at times, the judicial.  ̂ He concludes
Avery Leiserson, "The Place of Parties in the 
Study of Politics," American Political Science Review. 
LI, No, 4 (December, 1957), 948-949.
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that in order to acquire an understanding of democracy and its
problems, one must first study political parties both in
theory and action, for they are the criteria of democracy's
popular sovereignty, majority rule, group consultation and
minority rights.
Dther authorities have also stressed the importance
of political parties in the political life of societies.
Sigmund Neumann, for example, states that:
It is through the nexus of political parties that 
the manifold character and dynamic life of the 
different continents can be constantly revealed.^
Political parties, he argues, must be seen in the 
settings of their own governmental systems, historical 
circumstances, national characteristics and institutional 
traditions.^ Consequently, parties in their organization, 
function and outlook vary from country to country. In 
addition, the party system evolves in different forms in 
various countries. Since political parties enjoy key po­
sitions in political systems, their evolution has attracted 
the attention of a number of political scientists.
In addition to Sigmund Neumann’s book, Modern 
Political Parties. the study of parties has been accelerated
^Ibid.
2Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties: Approaches 
to Comparative Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1956), p. 2.
3Ibid.. p. 4.
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with the apperance of Political Parties by Maurice. Duverger. 
Although these works are limited in the scope of their study 
and are viewed with dissidence by critical political scien­
tists and the authors themselves, they nonetheless represent 
remarkable progress on this particular subject.̂
Some general comments about the nature of various 
party systems are necessary before attention is directed 
to the Mexican scene. These brief comments concern the 
nature of two party systems, multi-party systems, and 
democratic one-party systems.
The Mature of Two Party Systems 
Maurice Duverger, in discussing the origin of two party 
systems, suggests that political dualism is found in different 
sociological conceptions. He mentions that the revolutionary 
temperament can be contrasted with the conservative temper­
ament. Even countries which appear to have many divisions 
often reveal basic dual tendencies.^ For example, he notes 
that Francoise Goguel had been able to demonstrate the dual 
conflict between order and movement was the underlying factor 
of the Third French Republic^. The two-party system seems-;to *
■^Frederick C. Englemapn, "A Critique of Recent 
Writings on Political Parties," Comparative Politics:
A Reader, ed. Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter 
"[London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 378-385.
2Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their 
Organization And Activity In The Modern State, trans.
Barbara and Robert North (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 1955), pp. 215-216.
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correspond to the nature of things, for there is generally 
a choice between alternatives, lost of the major conflicts 
of history were of a dual nature.
Throughout history all the great factional 
conflicts have been dualist: Armagnacs and 
Burgundians, Guelphs and Ghibellines, Catholics 
and Protestants, Girondins and Jacobins, Conservatives 
and Liberals, Bourgeois and Socialists, ’Western’ 
and Communist ...•*■
Duverger argues that "the natural movement of societies 
tends towards the two-party s y s t e m . But if dualism is 
natural, why has it not flourished except in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and their imitators? Duverger answers this question 
by^suggesting that historical explanations can account for it, 
and if one wishes to determine the real origins of dual sys­
tems, he should investigate the circumstance in each country 
which determine the party system for the influences of na­
tional factors are considerable. However, one should not 
disregard major technical factors, such as the electoral sys­
tems. His conclusion is that the simple-majority, single­
ballot system tends to favor the two party system.
An almost complete correlation is observable 
between the simple-majority single-ballot system 
and the two-party system: dualist countries use 
the simple-majority vote and simple-majority vote 
countries are dualist.
^Ibid., p. 216. 
2Ibid.
3Ibid.. p. 217.
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E.E. Schattschneider concurs that the electoral system 
is a factor which directly influences the two-party system 
and states that since political parties center around elec-' 
tions , it would be strange indeed; if;the’ parties were not 
influenced by the nature of these elections.-̂
V.O. Key also regards the institutional factor of elec­
tions as being one of the factors shaping the duality of 
American politics. He notes that the single-member district 
and plurality elections can encourage dual division. Key 
also stipulates, as does Neumann, that the winner-take-all 
election of the president exerts a centripetal influence
oupon the organization of the party and encourages dualism.
Key stresses, however, that no one specific factor can be
attributed to the causation of party dualism.
The safest explanation is that several factors 
conspired toward the development of the American 
dual party pattern. These included the accidents 
of history that produced dual divisions on great 
issues at critical points in our history, the 
consequences of our institutional forms, the 
clustering of popular opinions around a point of 
central consensus rather than their bipolarization, 
and perhaps others.
E.E. Schattschneider, Political Parties And Democracy 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964), p. 27.
^V.O. Key, Politics. Parties & Pressure Groups 
(5th ed. rev, ; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), 
pp. 208-209.
3Ibid.. p. 210.
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\
Neumann also stresses that historical developments 
can be conducive of two-party development. These precedents 
he lists as follows: social homogeneity, political continuity, 
an early sanction of responsible political parties striving 
for political control, and political parties oriented toward 
one elective office, such as the presidency of the United 
States, or the premiership of Britain.-̂
The Nature and Evolution ofthe Multi-Party System 
Duverger, as stated before, subscribes to the theory 
that the two-party system is natural. When this system is 
subject to modification by a party split or overlapping 
interestshe suggests a multi-party system can develop. 
Internal divisions result in a split when factions become 
exasperated and can no longer find a common base; this 
type of split often causes center parties to rise. Over­
lapping of interests, on the other:: hand, is caused by a 
number of different dualisms of opinion which, when combined, 
result in multi-partite division. The mutual independence 
of sets of antitheses is a factor which causes the multi- 
partism to rise. Duverger shows, for example, that a series 
of antitheses in politics, sociology, economics, race and 
religion can give rise to a multi-partite split.^
"''Neumann, op. cit. , p. 402.
2Duverger, o£. cit., pp. 229-233.
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Gwendolen H. Carter and John H. Herz believe that what 
determines the development of a two-party or multi-party sys­
tem is the degree of unity within a community. They also 
state that '’multiparty systems obviously reflect divisions
within the community, divisions in social structure, economic
1interest, racial composition or ideological preference."
Sigmund Neumann accounts for the rise of the multi­
party systems by a historical interpretation.
Wherever fundamental cleavages in social 
structure evolve and continue to exist because of 
differences in nationalities, regions, religion, or 
class which are often fostered by outside influences 
like irrendenta movements and revolutionary inter­
nationals; wherever political revolutions coincide 
with great social transformations, as in France, 
central and eastern Europe, and the Near and Far 
East; wherever a controlling elite, through the 
divide-and-rule device, prevents parties from ful­
filling their genuinely political functions of 
presenting clear-cut policy alternatives, as in 
Bismarck’s strategies, for example; wherever the 
political machinery of a state diffuses the elec­
torate’s division by numerous choices— wherever 
any or all of these complicating factors enter the 
national political scene, a multiparty system finds 
its raison de*&tre.2
Neumann maintains that often multiparty systems tend 
to be centrifugal. He attributes this to their inability 
to gain majorities in elections which in turn causes
Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz, 
Government And Politics: In The Twentieth Century 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 110.
2Neumann, op. cit., p. 402.
3Ibid.
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multi-party systems to concentrate on the peripheral forces
of special interest groups.1
J.A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham support Neumann’s
theory and point out that in the French multi-party system
many of the French political parties resemble interest groups.
The French multi-party organization provided direct 
representation in the legislature to the various 
interests through the elective process. ?ery often, 
the leaders of the French interest groups were them­
selves elected to public office as leaders of the 
political parties and thus directly represented a 
particular interest for which these parties might 
stand--or, indeed, of which they were often frankly 
composed, e.g. the aforementioned Pouiadist party, 
whose sole aim was to perpetuate non-payment of taxes, 
or at least to make the tax-collector’s life miserable.2
The Nature and Evolution of the Single Party Systems 
The third and final form of party system to be discussed 
is the single party system. Although the idea of a single 
party system has often been equated with the idea of a total­
itarian or dictatorial party, the proliferation of single­
parties in democratic states leads many observers such as 
Duverger, Gabriel Almond, James Coleman, Gwendolen Carter and 
John Herz to the conclusion that non-authoritarian, one-party 
democracies can exist.
1Ibid.
2J.A. Corry and Henry J. Abraham, Elements of 
Democratic Government (4th ed. rev.; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), p. 354.
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Examples of one-party democracies can be seen in the 
Congress Party of India, the Republican People’s Party in 
Turkey, and the Party of Revolutionary Institutions in Mexico. 
Also democratic single-party systems exist in some African 
states.
Ruth Sehachter, in her discussion of mass parties in 
West Africa, notes that these single-party systems created 
by African leaders spring from the egalitarian and liberating 
forces which we associate with democracy. She suggests that 
some of these mass parties encourage factors which can make 
possible the working of the machinery of democratic systems.-*•
Robert Michel holds that there is a constant oligarchical 
tendency in social organizations. He remarks that this theory 
is applicable to political parties, for he believes that 
parties in their organization and operation are controlled by 
an elite group which rules without much limitation. If this 
is true in political parties as he claims', there would be 
little room for democracy within a one party system, for a 
single party,controlled by an elite group, would not offer 
the opportunity for democracy within its ranks. If democracy 
were to exist, there would have to be competition between: 
parties.
^Ruth Sehachter, "Single-Party Systems in West 
Africa," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 2 
(June, 1961), pp. 304-307.
^Francis W, Coker, Recent Political Thought (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962), p. 329.
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E.E. Schattschneider holds that all democratic systems 
are competitive and that democracy does not exist unless 
there are two or more parties which can nominate candidates 
and present alternative programs.'*' The argument is countered, 
however, by Duverger, that this needed choice of alternatives 
is often found within the ranks of the single party, and that 
although pluralism may be prohibited or limited outside the 
s i ngle-party , p luralism can, with the form a, ti0„Q_o.f__£a.c_ti © nsu, 
be reborn within the party.^
Gwendolen Carter and John Herz concur as to the pos­
sibility of intra-party democratic opposition:
The possibilities of criticism within the one- 
party democracy provide in themselves a type of op­
position which should not be underestimated. The mass 
parties in the newly developing countries are far 
from monolithic. It is far more difficult to identify 
and classify the kind of opposition1which operates, 
for example, within Felix Houphouet-Boigny’s RDA 
(Rassemblernent D^raocratique Africain), which holds all 
the seats in the Ivory Coast, than it would be if the 
opposition were organized as a separate party--but its 
existence has been abundantly evidenced by changing 
policies-» In other words, something very close to the 
interplay of government and opposition in mature de­
mocracies may take place within the one party of the 
new states, but only, of course, if opportunities for 
criticism are not stifled.3
"^Schattschneider, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
2Duverger, op. cit., pp. 278-279.
3Garter and Herz, pp. cit♦, p. 118.
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Again they note, "To have only one party . . .  is not 
a dogma but an expedient. The objective is to mobilize 
the people voluntarily to work for the vastly important 
objective of national development."^- Rupert Emerson sug­
gests, "The single party is an instrument to achieve the 
national solidarity which is otherwise conspicuous by its 
absence, and often it is the principal instrument available
for that purpose.
Although practice does not always confirm the argument, 
in principle it can be argued that the single-party can 
enlist the qualified leaders and populace of a country for 
a unified attack upon national problems, and thus they can 
avoid the dispersion of effort and the factionalism that 
often results when powerful opposition parties are in 
existence.^ Although minor opposition parties are legally 
allowed, their existence does not challenge the monopoly of 
the dominant one-party systems.
Often the single party becomes identified with the 
government. All government organs, executive, administrative, 
legislative and judicial, link their objectives with those of 
the party. It is noted that party members permeate the
^Ibid., p. 117.
..-Rupea?teEmer&6BQ- 'Political Modernizations Iffeer- 
Single PartyaSvstem 6f ; denver, Publication:
The Social Science Foundation and Department of Inter­
national Relations, No. 1, 1963-64), p. 25.
3M d . , P* 24.
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machinery '.of:, government.
The representatives of the party, therefore, have 
seats everywhere, from the Councils of Ministers 
to the smallest local or special committees; from 
the Civil Service to the Trade Unions, Co-operatives, 
Cultural Associations, etc; unless the party assumes 
directly certain functions, for itself or for its 
ancillary organizations.
Although single-party systems are generally cen­
tralized, they keep in contact with the mass through 
pyramidal, hierarchical structures. Within this structure, 
contact "is established not only upwards, in the direction 
’people-leaders’, but also downwards, in the direction 
’leaders-people’.
It has been noted that in emerging countries, single 
parties, symbolizing a nationalist movement and a struggle 
for independence, evolve and remain the dominant party. 
Gabriel A. Almond has classified such movements as domi­
nant non-authoritarian parties and notes:
Most of the significant interest groups, associa­
tions! and non-associational, have joined in the 
nationalist movement around a common program of 
national independence. In the period following 
emancipation the nationalist party continues as 
the greatly dominant party, opposed in elections 
by relatively small left-Wing or traditionalist 
and particularist movements. This type of party 
system is a formally free one, but the possibility 
of a coherent loyal opposition is lacking.^
Duverger, op. cit.. p. 258.
^Ibid.
3
Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed) 
The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, I960), p. 41.
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These parties , evolving in a society which is ^
changing, are subject to the influences of modernization 
such as urbanization and industrialization* V.O. Key 
regards certain aspects of modernization as factors which 
will eventually lead to its termination.- He remarks that 
the consequences of the change from a rural to an urban 
society and the development of industry and trade in a 
heretofore agrarian type of society pose a threat to the 
continuance of the one-party political systems within the 
South. Key particularly notes the potential force of 
urbanization and labor and states, "As obstructions to 
urban political activity are overcome, a significant expan­
sion of labor influence may be expected.**^
Robert J, Alexander notes, as does Key, the process  ̂
of modernization. Alexander, in dealing with Latin American 
parties also sees them as a reflection of the basic economic 
changes but does not predict their downfall. Alexander 
remarks that the changes in industrialization, urbanization, 
and population are creating a new society which is besieged 
by new interest groups, organized urban workers, new indus- 
trialists, and even peasantry. These elements are all
Vo. Key, Southern Politics: In State And Nation 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 673.
^Robert J. Alexander, "The Emergence of Modern 
Political Parties in Latin America,*' Politics of Change 
In Latin America ed. Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead 
"(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 101-102.
trying to seek their objectives through political activity.
The political parties, mirroring these changes, are becoming 
instruments to assist these new interests in their struggle.
This process of modernization is taking place in Mexico 
as it has in other Latin American countries. Here the Party 
of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI), the dominant non-author­
itarian party of Mexico, has controlled Mexican politics since 
its origin in 1929. Will this party, affected by moderniza­
tion, evolve, as Key predicts for the one-party system of the 
South, into another type of party system or, on the other 
hand, will it follow Alexander’s view and continue to persist 
as the dominant party? These questions will be explored 
throughout the thesis, but before an examination of the 
stability and instability of the PRI is presented, one must 
first become familiar with its evolution in Mexican society.
1Ibid.
CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MEXICAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM
On September 1, 1928, in his State of Union Address, I
Plutarco Calles told the Mexican people that they should 
pass "from the historical condition of a ’country of a 
nan1 to the ’nation of institutions and laws.’"I And 
in March of 1929, the instrument which was to change 
Mexico into a nation of institutions and laws, the 
National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario. 
or PNR) assembled in convention,' Prior to the formation of 
the PNR, Mexico had undergone rule by dictatorship followed 
by a period of experimentation with multiple political 
parties.
After independence was achieved in 1822, Mexico 
experienced a period in which political parties were 1 ^
virtually non-existent, for rule by dictators Was the
accepted order. However, two elements, which could not
- ,  ̂  ̂  ̂  ̂ —
Frank R. Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in 
One Party Democracy" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1956), p. 50., 
citing Camara de Diputados, Ano I, Vol. I, September,1928.
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be termed political parties in the current sense of the 
word, existed. These movements were the Centralist, a 
conservative organization representing professionals, 
military and large landowners, and the Federalist, a liberal
group representing the merchants, and the anticlerical and
1 / middle-class elements.'1 In 1908, President Porfirio Diaz
opened the gate to the formation of parties, and factions
within the conservative and liberal camps split into six
parties: the Scientists, the Anti-Re-electionist Party,
<
the Democratic Party, the Democratic Nationalist^arty, ! 
the Pure Liberal Party, and the Re-electionist Party.2
These parties supported candidates for the presiderttial 
election of 1909. But when it was seen that a peaceful 
transfer of power could not foe realized, a revolutionary 
movement begun by the intellectuals and supported by the 
middle class rose against the Diaz regime. This Revolution 
of 1910, the Mexicans feel, is a continuing revolution and 
will not be completed until its goals have been ‘achieved.
The chaos of the years immediately following the revolution 
left Mexico with little organized political activity.
■^William Tucker, The Mexican Government Today 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957), p. 41.
2Brandenburg, oj>. cit., pp. 2-9.
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Military factions which surrounded the revolutionary caudillos 
(bosses) were the main source of political action and effec­
tiveness.
From 1917 to 1929, an experimental period of multiple
political parties occurred. The Constitutional Liberal Party,
the National Cooperative Party, the Mexican Labor Party, the
National Agrarian Party, the Revolutionary Confederation, the
Mexican Communist Party and many state political parties
existed in this period.
Although the National Cooperative Party, the Mexican
Labor Party, and the National Agrarian Party, emerged at
times as influential parties, the period between 1917 and
1929 was one of instability in which parties vacillated in
response to personal leaders and ambitions. During this
£time, Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Calles were in control. 
Obregdh held the presidency from 1920 to 1924 and was suc­
ceeded in 1924 by Calles. In 1927, the Mexican Constitution 
was amended to allow a former president to be re-elected but  ̂
stipulated that a president could not succeed himself.̂
^Robert E. Scott, Mexican Government In Transition 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959), p. 118. 
oHoward F. Cline, The United States and Mexico 
(2d ed. rev.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 
pp. 194-195.
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Consequently, Obregc^n again ran successfully for the presi­
dency, but was assasinated before taking office. During the 
reign of these caudillos. the political system was besieged 
with problems from within and from without. Within the 
revolutionary family, bitterly expressed opinions arose as 
to what direction the Revolution should take. Because of
the vagueness and all-inclusiveness of the ideology of the ̂
Revolution, there was no definite consensus as to what 
objectives to seek. Outside the party, the anti-revolu­
tionary factions, the Church, the Porfirian industrialists,V
the large landholders, the political machines of the South
and the West, and the foreign interest posed a threat.J-
gUpon the assassination of president-elect Obregon in 1928, 
the political leaders at the national and state levels 
struggled for power and soon erstwhile revolutionaries 
were going against the government as were counter-revolu­
tionary forces.^ To meet the crisis, President Calles 'called
i' a
for the initiation of an all embracing revolutionary party.
(Calles) bound the regional and state political machines 
into a separate, formal, political organization. In 
turn its heads controlled the constitutionally prescribed 
organs of government— Executive, Judiciary,
Legislature.^
1Ibid.
2Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 53. 
^Cline, op. cit., p. 198.
-19-
The state political machines relinquished their local 
name and formed under the political machine of the revolu­
tionary party, the PNR. The states agreed to support a
national slate of candidates which would be selected by the
PNR’s executive committee, Comite E.jecutivo Nacional (CEN). I 
In return, they were given a share in national policy making 
and patronage. The national bureaucracy, the president’s
cabinet, and the legislature consisted solely of party
members. The judicial branch, appointed by the legislature, 
was !also a cog of the party.
This formation period of the party, which lasted until 
1935, was called Personalism©. During this time Calles 
strove to maintain his own personal power by limiting the 
authority of the president of Mexico:■ and by controlling \
the nation through the president of the PNR’s Central 
Executive Committee. From 1930 until 1935, a hegemony of 
the CEN existed over the executive, and legislative branches 
of government and Calles dictated the manner in which the 
government should be operated through the CEN. The CEN 
carried out his orders to the extreme that it often over­
ruled the presidents of Mexico.2
Calles tried to stabilize the CEN’s power by an at­
tempt to initiate a six year plan for Mexican governmental
1Ibid.. p. 199.
2Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 63-66.
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progress. The CEN was to act as a reviewing board for this
plan of government. The plan, placing as it would party and
governmental power upon the president of the PNR, reduced
Mexico’s president to a figurehead.^
The Six Year Plan of Calles^was thwarted by the election
of L^zaro Clrdenas to the Mexican presidency in 1934.
Cardenas, being a liberal and opposed to the conservative
Calle’s program, sought to initiate his own plan. Cardenas
received assurances from labor and agrarian leaders of their
support, took care that all influential military personnel
owere on his side, and broke with Calles. Thus, on June 1, 1 
1935 the first phase of the PNR’s history came to an end.
The second phase of the party, the period of 
Collectivism, began in 1935 and lasted until 1943. clrdenas 
sought to integrate the labor forces into the PNR and to 
unify the agrarian forces. In 1935, c/xdenas adopted an 
"open-door policy" to be followed with regard to the agrarian 
organizations.and labor.. Membership in an established union 
or in an e.jido. center of the communal land systems, pre­
supposed the individual qualifications for party membership.^ 
In 1937 the Party of the Mexican Revolution took on a 
new organization, corporate structure and a new name, the
I ~  ' ' ~  ' "
Ibid., p. 69.
^Ibid., p. 76.
3Ibid.. p. 81.
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Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM). The PRM’s structure
was divided into four sectors, agriculture, labor, popular,
and military. The basis of these was the local organization j
such as the labor union. These local organizations were
grouped into statewide federations and the state federation
represented the sectors in a nationwide sector organization.
Cardenas, by uniting the most active interest groupings
under the auspices of the party where they could be controlled
by national-level sector organizations, centralized political
control in the capital. A pyramidal structure was established >
with control emanating from the top rather than from the
grass roots. This corporative nature obliterated the local
opolitical machines of the caudillos.
It was during this period that the PRM became the
'official party,* for it became identified with the state,. ^
The president of the party’s National Executive 
Committee met with the president’s cabinet as a 
matter of course, and quite frequently the party 
actually initiated official actions. Starting’ 
with Cdrdenas' administration, for example, Six- 
Year Plans for economic and social development 
were prepared by the PRM, 'with the government 
collaborating,’ as one of the plans describes 
the process.
Cardenas ended the duarchy of the party and government
Ibeing run separately, and from this time they have become
^Scott, ojd . cit. , p p .  131-132. 
^Ibid., pp. 134-135.
^Ibid., p. 136.
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almost synonymous. There has been a broader inclusion of the 
people in the party’s ranks, and the actual government has 
been representing more and more people.^
“Institutionalism," phase three of the party’s 
development, began in March of 1943 when the Mational 
Federation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) united with the 
CMC and the labor unions to select party candidates for 
federal, state, and municipal offices.̂
President Avila Camacho, Cardenas’ successor, demili­
tarized the party by abandoning the military sector and made 
changes in the party’s operation by adding more represen­
tation from the lower middle classes. Membership within the 
party was put on a direct and individual basis; thus, the 
individual could enroll and escape the power of the bosses.^ 
Public dissatisfaction, owing to the fact that the PRM’s 
functional organizations could not successfully incorporate 
the ever-increasing Mexican interests outside the member' as­
sociations, led to a change in the name and structure of the 
party. In 1946 the PRM became the PRI, the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional. as it is still known. The 
corporate structure and political power of the sectors were 
temporarily terminated. Across the board primaries ended
^Cline, op. cit., p. 324.
“̂Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 101. 
3Cline, o£. cit., p. 325.
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the sector designation of candidates and presidential nomi­
nations were no longer to be sector controlled but based on 
the selection of ten delegates in each election district*  ̂
However, an internal party conflict arose, for the PRI sectors 
did not wish to relinquish their previous status, and it 
seemed that there was not enough loyalty to general prin­
ciples to enable the party to function in a "give-and-take 
atmosphere of primary elections. Consequently, at a 
meeting in Cuernavaca in 1950, the reversion to the sector 
organization was undertaken. But the conditions which had 
originally required a change from the sector organizational 
structure could not be disregarded. Thus, the party made an 
attempt to integrate and satisfy these expanding interests 
by broadening and expanding the alternative means of access 
to the decision making process. More interest associations | 
were brought into the PRI, especially through the Popular 
Sector, and attempts were made to implement governmental 
recognition of those interests which remained outside the 
official party structure.
Equally important, the consultative process whereby 
important factors in Mexico's society and economy 
which are not part of the sector organizations can 
participate in political decisions affecting their, . 
status has been institutionalized to a very great 
extent.
■'"Scott, op. Git.. pp. 140-141.
2Ibid., p. 142.
^Ibid., pp. 142-143.
4Ibid.
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The preceding pages have traced the evolution of 
Mexico’s single party system from its period of personal 
control, through its stage of collectivism and finally to 
its current stage of an institutionalized party. How will 
this party evolve in the future? Will its dominance persist 
or will the one-party system be successfully challenged?
What factors contribute to the stability and instability 
of this one-party dominance? These are the questions which 
will be explored in the ensuing chapters.
CHAPTER III
THE STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRI
The PRI functions through a highly centralized 
hierarchical structure which extends from the national 
level, through the state level, to the local municipal 
level. Through its organization of committees and its 
three sectors, the farm, labor, and popular, the PRI 
presents an institutionalized party system which is able 
to reach out and envelop all strata of Mexican society.
I
It is through this Complex party machine that the PRI 
seeks to balance the interests of Mexico’s pluralistic 
society.
At the national level, the party is organized 
through the National Assembly, the Gran Comisi^n and 
the Central Executive Committee (CEC).
The National Assembly, nominally the supreme organ 
of the party, meets every three years. This assembly 
examines the activities of the other party national 
organs, reviews national politics in the light of the
-25-
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party’s program and ©lects the Central Executive Committee.
The National Assembly’s membership of about 1,000 is evenly 
divided among the three sectors. The meetings of the 
National Assembly are controlled by sector and party leader­
ship .
The Gran Comisicfn is the agency in which the supreme 
power of the PRI is vested between the sessions of the 
Assembly. The Gran Comisi<fet8s membership of thirty is 
equally divided among the sectors. It meets at the call of 
the Central Executive Coum’ittee, checks the annual report of
the CEC, and reviews any sanctions which the Central Executive
2Committee may have imposed against party members.
Despite the statutory prominence of the National 
Assembly, the most important organ of the PRI is the Central 
Executive ColWBittee, for it is this committee which repre­
sents the PRI throughout the entire country.
Of the three, the Central Committee and its pres­
ident are, by far the most influential, partly because 
the party’s"’ statutes give the® a high degree of 
strategic'control over other party organs, partly 
because the Committee's membership represents functional 
interest associations which are the principal sources of 
political power, and paitly because it is through this 
agency that the President of the Republic wields his 
concentrated authority.3
-   *   ■ -   •— -  ■   -   ■ ■   ...
1Ibid.. p. 155.
^Ibid., p. 156.
3Ibid.. p. 155.
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The Central Committee’s membership is comprised of 
representatives from the three sectors. There are seven 
members on the Central Committee: the President, the 
Secrfetary-General, the Secretary of Agrarian Activities, 
the Secretary of Labor Activities, and two secretaries, 
one from the Senate and the other from the Chamber of 
Deputies for political Activities. The Central Committee 
is able to reach and influence many factions to a great 
extent, for it controls the other functional organs of 
the party: it can reach out to the sectors; it directs the 
state and local committees; it advises the National Assembly
lon decisions; and it controls the nomination of officers.
The president of Mexico and the CEC approve internal nomi­
nating procedures for the PRI’s candidates.2 Who is to run 
for what office is decided within the ranks of the PRI, and
is announced to the populace. Nominating conventions of the
PRI_are nothing more th_a.P_r-U.bber stamp approv a l o f  the PRI
selected candidates. The CEC is not completely a one-way 
organ, for it listens to the interest of the people ex­
pressed by representatives of the sectors, and they influence 
its decision making and selection of nominees. The CEC has
Ibid., pp. 156-157.
oIbid., p. 161.
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tried to aggregate and articulate the interest of the sectors 
and other factions, and has sought to further understanding 
among the president::I'M;,his cabinet,national committees of 
labor, professional, commercial, industrial and small property 
groups. -*•
The CEC's offices in Mexico City and at regional levels 
are crowded daily with political groups, functional groups, 
and ad hoc groups which exchange information, ideas and argue 
about how to seek their objective’s,2
Often the CEC acts as an intermediary between the gov­
ernment and the people. An example of this is shown in the 
Arroyo de Lanzarote dam case. When small property owners, 
being deprived of what they considered their just share of 
the waters of the Arroyo de Lanzarote and suffering severe 
crop damages as the consequence, failed to receive a response 
to their request that the government make a decision as to 
the allocation of the waters, the CEC’s Secretary of Agrarian 
Activities took the problem to the federal agency of Water 
Resources and gained an administrative ruling that provided 
for an equitable distribution of the water
"^Vincent L. Padgett, "Mexico’s One-Party System:
A Re-evaluation." American Political Science Review, XLI 
(December, 1957), 1000.
2Ibid„,
3Ibid.
- 2 9 -
The control of party activities from the national to the 
municipal level is controlled by the CEC. As Scott maintains, 
"In short, it is the apex of the hierarchical pyramid organ­
ization that controls the entire party.
In addition to judging the intra-party electoral proce­
dures, the CEG also seeks to solve intra-party conflicts.
Each of the GEC secretaries of labor, farm, and popular, 
being members of the sectors which correspond with their 
party office, are continually pressing the needs of their 
corresponding sectors and seeking to solve their problems.
The two political secretaries find that it is their duty to 
discuss given projects of the executive branch with congres­
sional members, officers of the party, governors, and leaders 
of the sectors.
The secretaries ;of political action have functioned 
through personal conversations to keep the views of 
the organized power groupings, groups of the execu­
tive branch, and congressional leaders from becoming 
so divergent as to create misunderstanding and ill 
will on any issue of political importance'— whether 
it might be a legislative proposal or the result of « 
some contested intra-party or constitutional elections.
Although Congress always seems united on all legislative
measures, it is the job of the party political secretaries
................. ... ..................................... .....'— — I II. >         -  1 I ' m  L .n-n i. irw , t i, I ii mil
1Scotty. op. eft. , p'. 157.
2 ■  .......cLeon:V^,Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican 
One Party System" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Northwestern, 1955;, p. 142.
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to "secure a unanimity in fact which will constitute a real 
basis for the formal unanimity characterizing legislative 
approval of the measure."-^ It is their duty to convince the 
various interests of the worthiness of the measure, and, if 
failing in this, to try to seek a compromise between the 
executive goals and those of the affected groups.*^
Below the national level are the Regional Committees, 
These committees function in the twenty-nine states of 
Mexico, its two territories, and the Federal District. Each 
Regional Committee has six members. Its structure is the 
same as the CEC, with the exception that is has one secretary 
for Political Activities, not two.^
These Regional Committees have helped to link the gov­
ernment and the people together. They have provided alter­
nate channels of communication when personality conflicts or 
minority interests have frustrated attempts to deal with the 
government through the regular interest groups and committees. 
The interpretation of popular selection with regard to the 
choice of candidates for municipal offices Is another impor­
tant function of the Regional Committees.^ The Regional
^Ibid., p. 141.
2Ibid.
2Ibid.. p. 159.
^Padgett, op. cit., p. 1002.
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Committees solve differences among the sectors, and between 
individuals in the party; they create local centers for 
political study; and, with the approval of the CEC, they call 
state-level nominating conventionsThe president of these 
committees has the same power as does the president of the 
CEC, only his is confined to the state level.
The Municipal Committee or District Committee, confined 
to the Federal District only, are the committees at the 
local level of government. There are five municipal commit­
teemen, supposedly representative of the economic and social 
areas of which they serve, and these five elect a president 
and a secretary-general from among their own membership.
These committees help to carry out the PRI's program at a 
local level and are responsible for keeping a list of party 
membership.2
With fegard to party membership , the PRI views it­
self as a ”1 national association’ of the progressive com­
ponents of the Mexican population.1,2 Qualification for its
  - ■ -  1 - ■ -   -- -■   —    — -
■'‘Scott, op. cit., p. 160.
2Ibid., p. 162.
3Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 130.
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members are presented in a statutory provision:
Mexican citizens in full exercise of their political 
rights who apply for and obtain affiliation with the 
Party, respect its declaration of principles, publicly 
avow to comply with its statutes, programs, and reso1 
lutions, and who, besides observing good conduct, may 
not be minister of any cult, belong to any religious 
corporation or association whose principles, programs, 
or campaign tactics are in opposition to those of the 
Party, or to any other group organized for political 
purposes.
The PRI seeks to include the major organized interests 
of the country within its membership (with the exception of 
large business). These interests are organized into the 
three party sectors, farm, labor, and popular.^
These sector organizations are the heart of the PRI*s 
power. Sector members fill party positions at the state 
and national levels and are seated on the CEC. The sectors 
pay most of the bills, acquire the votes, and turn out people 
for PRI rallies.^ PRI nominations to elective posts, usually 
synonymous with election, are given to the sector which is 
strongest in the district to be represented. The standard 
of strength is accorded by numbers. Consequently, this 
factor has caused the sector organizations to conduct their
•̂Ibid., p. 131.
L. - . i - 1 1 . ; ) 0  . ■- j.’.« J. ■ ■  ̂ 'i
Martin: C. Needier, '’The Political Development of 
Mexico," American Political Science Review LV, No. 2 
(June, 1961), 309.
3Philip R. Taylor, "The Mexican Elections of 1958: 
Affirmation of Authoritarianism," Western Political Quarterly, 
XII, No. 3 (Spring, 1960), 735.
own recruiting campaigns, for the more members they acquire 
the greater their bargaining power. This, in turn, has caused 
an expansion of the proportion of the populace represented in 
the decision making process. This representation by sector 
strength has caused the Popular Sector to emerge as the. dom­
inate sector, for excluding the farm and labor elements of 
society, the Popular Sector can claim to represent virtually 
the whole of Mexico.^ However, the farm and labor sectors 
possess considerable power and cannot be neglected in a 
review of the sectors.
The Farm Sector came into existence in 1938 when the 
National Campesino Confederation (CMC), the national farmers 
organization:..., signed a pact of unity which M bestowed upon 
a central organisi® the power of liaison and national 
representation.
The CNC, the largest interest group in Mexico, is the 
major associational group of the Farm Sector. It represents 
2,332,914 e.jido families and 150,000 sindicatos campesinos, 
organized wage-laborers. The CNC remains dominant in the 
Farm Sector, but another group, the Sociedad Agronomica, 
comprised of professional agronomists and having a membership 
of 10,000 was added in 1952.^
■^Needier, op. cit. , pp. 309-311. 
Brandenburg, gjg. cit. , p. 177.
3Scott, op. cit., p. 166.
-34-
The CNC extends from the national to the state levels.
At the national level, the National Elective Committee of 
14 members, the National Convention of 160 members, the 
Mexican Agronomers Society, and the League of Agrarian 
Communities and Campesino Unions of '32. members, preside 
over the CNC. At the state or regional level, the Regional 
Campesino Committees, totalling 512 persons, administer CNC 
control. And at the local level of the e.iido. control is 
vested in the Ejido Commisariats and the Boards of 
Vigilance.^
The close cooperation between the government and the 
CNC is notable. The party’s national Secretary of Agrarian 
Action, a member of the CEC,receives instruction from the 
heads of the CNC and informs them of important CEC delib­
erations. 2 in the Federal District, and at state and local 
levels, CNC members serve on the party committees. The CNC 
structure, parallel to that of the party, permits the CNC 
close participation ihotheideliberaiioasianieeleotions ©fothe 
PRI.3
Within the Labor Sector, the Confederacion de 
TraSaiadores. Mexlcanos ■ (CTM) represents 1,500',000 workers.
iBrandenburg, op. cit., p. 178. 
^Ibid., p. 185.
^Ibid., p. 186.
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The CTM along with the Confederacies Regional de Obreros 
Mexicanos (CROM), the Confederaci^n General de Txaba.jadores 
(CGT), the railroad workers, the mining and metal workers, 
the petroleum workers, and other independent unions!form'the 
Bloque de Unidad Obrera (BUG) and comprise eighty-five, per 
cent of the Labor Sector, with a total membership of 
1,873,000. Within the Labor Sector is an opposing faction 
called the anti-BUO bloc. This bloc is commonly thought to 
be leftist oriented. It is headed by the Confederacion 
Revolucionaria de Qbreros y Campesinos (CROC) which is sup­
ported by the Conf ederacion Revolucionaria de Txaba.jadores 
(CRT), an electrical workers union, and other independent 
unions. -*•
The CTM's strength as the largest union in the Labor 
Sector can be observed by the fact that since the formation 
of the party, the PRI’s national head of Labor Activities 
has been a CTM leader.2
The CTM’s organization, based upon politico-territorial 
divisions of Mexico, allows it to participate directly in 
party activities, and it can be noted that CTM members are 
present in the internal elections of the official party. At 
■the head of the labor hierarchy, the National Executive 
Committee of the Confederation, comprised of ten men,presides.
^Scott, op. cit. , pp. 164-168.
oBrandenburg, op. cit., p. 216.
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Subordinate to it are the 32 federaci^nes estatales, which 
embrace the states, territories, and the Federal District. 
Regional federations, (federacidnes regionals) and local fed­
erations (federaci<^nes municipales) complete the structure.
The Popular Sector headed by the National 
Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) which differs 
from the other two sector’s controlling organs, in that the 
CNOP is preeminently a political o r g a n . 2 Since the Popular 
Sector represents practically all the interests of Mexican 
society which are not included in the farm and labor sectors, 
it is the largest sector with 6,621,000 members. And as 
mentioned previously, because of its numerical strength, it 
has become the sector with the greatest representation in 
the Senate and Federal Assembly. The CNOP contains within 
its ten divisions the Bureaucrats Union (FSTSE) which is 
favored by the government. In addition to this powerful 
interest group, the Popular Sector is divided into nine other 
sections: the cooperatists, small farmers, small industri­
alists, small merchants, prof@ssionals--intellectuals, youth 
groups, feminine groups, artisans, and diversified. The last 
one is a catch-all category designed to incorporate any new
1Ibid., pp. 217-219. 
2Ibid., p. 236.
^Scott, op. cit., p. 170.
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interests ox previously unaffiliated Mexicans. It may be 
noted that because of the Popular Sector’s envelopment of 
the greater portion of Mexican interests, and the ever in­
creasing number of interests which seek PRI affiliation, this 
Popular Sector will most likely continue to expand and grow 
in itself and in relation to the other two sectors.
From the preceding pages, it can be observed that the 
structural organization of the PRI has provided the party 
with a centralized, hierarchically structured, political 
machine. Through this machine, the PRI has set itself $s a 
symbol of mutual interest and has sought to facilitate the 
flow of information and to reconcile the conflicting opinions 
among groups and leaders at all levels of government.^
It is significant that the party has formed such a 
machine, for in essence it is within the interaction of this 
party machine and its dealings with fhe government that one 
finds democratic action and participation in Mexican politics. 
Neither the Congress nor the ballot have evolved as centers 
for political action, but it is in the intra-party struggles 
where the real contest occurs.
The predominant considerations in the architecture 
of Mexican "revolutionary*' political institutions from 
the standpoint of opportunities for popular participation 
have focused primarily on the intergroup and
’'‘Padgett, "Mexico’s One-Party System,", p. 999.
2Padgett, "Popular Participation m  the Mexican 
One-Party System,", pp. 260-261.
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interpersonal relationships linking the groups in 
government with the directive committees of the Party 
on the one hand and with the leadership of the organized 
"revolutionary1' interest of functional groupings on the 
other.1
Political action revolves around the executive office at 
national,state, and local levels, and party committees at the 
national, regional, and municipal levels. It is within'and 
among these institutions that the sector committees at the 
corresponding level must deal to secure their desires or to 
eradicate conflicts.
Such an arrangement has made it especially impor­
tant that there be an opportunity on the part of the 
rank and file members of the associated 'revolutionary' 
groups to express choice with regard to committee 
leadership of the respective organizations. It has been 
these committees working closely with key personnel in 
governraent--especially with members of the executive 
branch and with the committees of the Paity--who have 
made the decisions concerning candidates for succession 
to public office. And the same has been true of de-' 
cision making in other diverse areas such as ejido 
credit, community schools, the expansion as well as 
improvement of administration of labor benefits and the 
procurement of low cost housing.3
The apex of the hierarchical structure at each level is 
the executive; at the local, he is the mayor, at the state, 
the governor, and at the nation, the president. At each level 
the executive acts as the great center to which the sectors 
and party committees can submit their measures, and problems
1lbid.
^Ibid., p. 262. 
^Ibid., p. 261.
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for approval and arbitration. Although executives at lower 
levels are increasingly making more and more decisions, they 
are nevertheless subject to intervention from the next higher 
level of government.
The ultimate power rests in the office of the president 
of Mexico; most often the major measures of legislation and 
the most pertinent problems are sent to his office. Since 
the interests of Mexico have been increasing, it is difficult 
for any one individual such as the president to handle all 
matters directly. Consequently, he has begun to allocate 
responsibility to others and to rely upon their advice in 
making his decisions. The eighteen line departments and many 
independent or semi-independent agencies perform such duties. 
The work of these is coordinated by the agency known as the 
Presidential Office (Secretaria de la Presidencia).^
In addition to the Presidential Office, there has been 
a recent tendency for the president to organize consultative 
agencies. One such important ..agency has been the Council for 
Development and Coordination of National Production (Conse.io 
de Fomento y Coordinacii^n de la Producci^n Nacional). Its 
duty is to bring together thfe representatives of agriculture 
and industry to discuss their common difficulties and to rec­
ommend their solutions to the president. (Thus, it may be 
noted that rather; than being a real part of the policy
"̂ Scott, 0£. cit. . pp. 278-288.
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making machinery of the presidency as the Presidential Office, 
these consultative agencies are auxiliary agencies in exec­
utive decision making.) Such consultative agencies are carried 
down to lower executive levels also.1 It is the executive 
and his office which in the end are left to formulate the 
important policy and to help the sectors to compromise and 
agree. However, the importance of the party committees, which 
work as the main intermediaries between the sectors and the 
executive and his office, must not be neglected.
The CEC, as the national party committee, has assumed
the role as "chief arbiter throughout the entire range of
2intra-Party difficulties." The CEC has played a particularly 
important position in the settlement of intra-party electoral 
assemblies. The president of the CEC with the help of the 
CEC secretary general and the Pireci6n de Asuntos Juridicos 
(the CEC agency which is concerned with the validity of elec­
toral assemblies decisions) has to resolve the rivalries 
among the sectors in the intra-party elections and to report 
to the president of Mexico the list of delegates which he 
believes to be qualified and entitled to receive the PRI nom­
ination for Congress. The decision the CEC president submits 
to the president of Mexico is usually approved by the presi- 
dent of Mexico, for the CEC president is usually a trusted
1Ibid. , pp. 289-291..
2Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican One- 
Party System", pp. 117-118.
- 4 1 -
friend of the Mexican president and provides a direct link 
between the hierarchy of the party and the summit of the 
executive branch.
The Regional Committees of the PRI serve as agencies 
to smooth over intra-party conflict at the state and local 
levels. And here too at intra-party election time, the 
regional president and his committee are most important 
in the process of selecting what candidates of the sector’s 
axe qualified for municipal offices. ( It may be noted that 
the president of the regional party is usually a personal
A
friend of the governor.)
CHAPTER IV
PRI AND STABILITY
In addition to the organizational structure of the PRI, 
there are other factors which help to insure the continuance 
of the Mexican one-party system. The ensuing pages deal with 
these elements of stability.
PRI* s Identif ication with the Government
There is extensive overlapping and interaction between 
the party and the government. The president of Mexico is 
simultaneously the head of the government and of the PRI. 
Government officials are active in the sectors of the PRI 
and are most often chosen from the ranks of the sectors. It 
may be of particular note to emphasize again that the civil 
servants of the government comprise an associational interest 
group within the Popular Sector of the PRI.
To the Mexican citizen, the PRI and the government are 
as one."*" Because the party overlaps almost entirely with the 
formal agencies of government, it has acquired the name of
"'"Scott, op. cit., p. 136.
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the "official party." Scott noted:
Identification of the official party with the state 
became so confused in the minds of the party bosses that 
the Supreme Court was forced to remind them in one case 
that "the PRM is not a dependency of the federal exec­
utive power; . . .  it does not constitute an official 
service . . .  so its thirty per cent discount ( on tele­
phone service ) cannot be enforced by legal- means.'
As late as 1950, President Aleman issued an exec­
utive decree assigning "the property known as the ex­
chapel of La Milagrosa in Guadalajara, Jalisco, to the 
service of the state, to install the offices of the 
PRI.1
In order to understand to the fullest extent the party- 
government identity, the three main branches of the govern­
ment, the executive, legislative, and judicial should be ex­
amined. Since the formation of the party, the president of 
Mexico has been a party member and has received overwhelming 
majorities in the elections. The following is a list of the 
per cent of the votes cast in the presidential elections for 
the PRI candidates: Pascual Ortiz Rubio, 93.56; L^zaro 
Cardenas, 98; Avila Camacho, 93.1; Miguel Aleman, 80.1;
fRuiz Cortines, 76.4; Lopea Mateos 90.4; and Diaz Ordaz 89.
The power of the office of the Mexican president has 
been strengthened by the tradition of authoritarianism, by 
a broad grant of constitutional powers, and by the president’s 
position as head of the political machinery in Mexico.^
1Ibid.
2Ibid., p. 247.
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Authoritarianism in Mexico, as in other Latin American 
countries, continues to play a significant role. This aspect 
of Spanish colonial influence is still felt; it is apparent 
that the president’s power is similar to that of the royal 
colonial regimes.
A number of us who have seen peasant delegations 
waiting for.the President of Mexico . . . have been 
struck by the fact that we: were watching the General 
Indian Court of New Spain functioning today rather 
much as it must have when Antonio de Mendoza gave it 
informal existence or Luis de Velasco II gave it 
formal structure. J-
The authoritarian aspect of the presidency can be seen 
in the fact that no official figure at a local, state, or 
national level can remain in his position if he does not 
conform with the president’s policy. Nol: only that, but 
the president's influence extends to the making or breaking 
of leaders of the Mexican interest groups.2
For labor and agrarian leaders, and even for the 
representatives of the growing business and manufac­
turing interests outside the PRI, his power to recog­
nize strikes, to grant or refuse road or irrigation 
projects, to remit state and municipio debts to the 
national government , to apply or relax taxes or trade 
regulations, and all the other discretionary decisions 
he can render make the president master of their 
destinies.^
Woodrow Borah, Charles Gibson, and Robert A. Potash, 
’Colonial Institutions And Contemporary Latin America,” 
Hispanic American Historical Review, XLIII (August, 1963), ; 
374.
^Scott, ojg. cit. , p. 259. 
^Ibid., p. 261.
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The systematization and formalization of the political 
machinery of the PRI plus the growth of functional interest 
associations outside the PRI’s margins have called for a force 
to evolve which can synthesize and compromise these interests 
for effective articulation and aggregation.'*' This force has 
been the president of Mexico. But because of the broadening 
of the base of interests, the president relies on the aid of 
organizations which have evolved within the office of the 
presidency. These agencies have evolved primarily for their 
technical competence and political adaptability. Among 
these agencies are the following eighteen executive depart­
ments: Government, Foreign Affairs, Treasury, National ; 
Defense, Marine Affairs, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture 
and Animal Industry, Water Resources, Public Education,
Health and Aid, Labor and Welfare, National Patrimony, 
Communications and Transport, Public Works, Presidency; 
and the three departamentos: Tourism, Agrarian and 
Colonization Affairs and Federal District.^ And as mentioned, 
many independent and semi-independent agencies and the Office 
of the President have arisen which help manage government 
affairs and coordinate government activity.
However, in the end, it is the president with whom the 
responsibility lies. It is he who controls the basic
^Ibid., p. 246.
2Ibid., p. 281i
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operations of the office of the presidency and profoundly 
influences the other branches of government. It is evident 
that the president has used his constitutional grant to act 
on legi.slative matters to the fullest extent. In fact, it is 
said, ‘•"The Congress is itself but a creature of the President, 
and all the extensive powers of that legislative body must be 
subsumed under the executive branch."1
The Congress has been termed as not more than a rubber 
stamp of approval, for it receives bills which have already 
been discussed, debated, and decided by the executive. 
Privately sponsored bills are rare and have little chance of 
being passed; only government inspired measures get the green 
light in Congress.
The Congress is PRI controlled. The Senate, with but 
one exception, is composed of partisans of the PRI. The 
Chamber of Deputies , although allowing for the seating of 
opposition candidates, is comprised mainly of party people. 
Even with the new electoral laws providing for a proportional 
representation system, the PRI in the 1964 Congress controlled 
175 delegates compared to the 35 delegates of the three oppo­
sition parties.^ Although there is speculation that the
i
■̂ James L. Busey, Latin America: Political Institutions 
and Processes (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 30-31.
2"Mexico." Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 8 
(October , 1964), 687.
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increase of representatives of 'opposition parties might 
encourage debate in the Chambers, it is still generally held 
that these seats are but honorary bestowals and will not 
disrupt the rubber-stamp organ.
The President and the Senate, by a majority vote, select 
the members of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court chooses 
the judges at inferior levels; however, it is usually con­
tended that the PRI and executive branch aid them in their 
selections.
The Mexican judges are subject to removal by a majority 
vote of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and upon recom­
mendation of the president.^
It is generally held that the Mexican courts refrain 
from rendering judgments which would be contrary to PRI 
policy.
It is clear that the courts never take a position 
contrary to that of executive policy. No writs of 
amparo issue against actions by the President, by 
members of his official family, by leading members of 
the PRI; or against federal legislation which has been 
passed by the Congress.3
It is thus observed that the PRI can be identified with 
the major branches of the Mexican government, for the execu­
tive, legislative and judicial branches are managed andt
^Busey, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
2Ibid.. p. 39.
3Ibid.
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controlled by party affiliates. The official party has not 
only identified itself with the goals of the government but 
has managed to do the same with the ideals of the Mexican 
people, the goals of the Revolution of 1910.
The PRI and the Revolution 
The Mexican nation of todayiidentifiesii&seifwwiihTthe 
Revolution of 1910. This revolutionary movement was begurl 
by an intellectual element and supported by the middle class. 
It is difficult to define the Revolution in terms of strict 
ideology, for at the time it begun it had none. All of its 
leaders voiced different ideals and it was a combination of 
these that later became correlated with the goals of the 
Revolution. The ideas most associated with the Revolution are 
found in the Constitution of 1917; they are: effectual suf­
frage, agrarian reform, non-reelection of the president, anti- 
clericalism, an exclusion of the Church from politics, im­
provement of the Indian class, and finally, the expulsion of 
the foreign imperialist from Mexico.^
The PRI has managed to become so identified with the 
goals of the Revolution that a vote against it is similar to 
voting against the ideas of Mexican patriotism. Since 1929 
when Calles gathered the diverse interests of the Revolution
^Harold Eugene Davis, Government and Politics in 
Latin America (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1958), 
p. 134.
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into a single party, the party has been the guardian of the 
Revolution.
This Revolution still has values in Mexico, for it 
remains as a unifying force and has set broad outlines for 
the party's platform. It acts as a restraint against 
excesses of private development, keeps alive issues such as 
investment in the public sector, and land reform, and, 
finally, lays down the basic' operating procedure for labor 
laws, secular education, social welfare, e.iido reform and 
the principal of no re-election for the president.i
The party has been adept in its ability to adapt 
the Revolution to changing circumstances.^ This can be 
attributed, in large part, to the fact that the Revolution 
is not held to any rigid ideology. This adaptability has 
additional advantages since the lack of an orthodox 
political creed and the open nature of the party allows it 
to exist free from the spiritual aridity of a closed system 
and terrorism.3
The party and its identification with the Revolution 
have had an important psychological effect upon the Mexican 
people. In The Civic Culture, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba
^Botsford, op. cit. . p. 14 
oAlexander, op. cit., p. 117.
^Octavio Paz, "The Mexican Revolution Today,"
Dissent IX, No. 4 (Autumn, 1962), 328.
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conclude that pride in the Mexican nation is dependent to a 
considerable extent on the continuing symbolic identification 
with the Revolution. They found that the Mexican people have 
a great sense of political pride which can be traced to the
i 1
Revolution; 65 per cent of those interviewed could name goals 
of the Revolution. Upon further questiondngo, 61 ppr cent
'i
stated that they felt the Revolution was continuing while 
only 25 per cent felt that its goals had been realized and 
14 per cent felt that they had been forgotten.1
The overwhelming success of the PRI in every election is 
the product of this seemingly mystical commitment to the 
Revolution. The party has been able to personify and define 
the Revolution. But in addition, it is notedthat, thexPEI's 
success is also a product of fence-mending and political 
maneuvering.^ This political maneuvering has been an attempt 
of the official party to achieve unanimity.
PRI and Unanimity 
The PRI seeks to lessen the power of other political 
actors by embracing the political spectrum's center and by 
alloting to each faction within the party a definite area
■^Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes And Democracy In Five Nations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press’̂ 1963), p. 104.
^Taylor, oja. cit., pp. 723-729.
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in which it may '’legitimately, though always within the 
rnajority--exert its pressure." ~ /It presents.>t'<b,~the_ pppg&ition 
the idea ©f, "Why fight us? Join us and continue your struggle 
within the majority, for only the majority has effective 
power.”2
The party has sought to achieve this unanimity by ’ 
JbSoacfening and making more democratic the basis of party 
membership, and has also tried to represent the interests of 
Mexico whether they are within the party’s official ranks or 
are outside the PRI’s .membership.
PRI and Democracy
f -  _
Foreign observers view the party as democratic in that 
the PRI is a "rambling coalition of social groups and politr 
ical views, from right wing Catholic to Marxist socialist, 
and reflects reasonably accurately the forces and trends in 
the country.
A democratizing process within the party can be observed 
by its broadening of representation within its ranks. The 
government has continued to represent progressively more and 
more people.4 The PRI has attempted to incorporate groups
^Botsford, gjg. cit. , p. 15.
^Ibid., p. 14.
3"Battle Tremors in the Model State," The Economist, 
CCIV (August 25, 1962), 706.
4Cline, op. cit., p. 420.
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into its sectors which heretofore had been politically 
apathetic or unable to be legally affiliated with parties 
and elections. Although the youth section of the PRI had 
grown to 78,000 members, in 1962 the party chairman,
Alfonso Corona del Roral, urged more youth participation. 
Recruitment of membership is advocated and active programs 
for youth training are being carried on at the Centrol de 
Qrientacion Politica in Mexico City. Also, proposals are 
made for increasing the number of PRI sponsored centers for 
economic, political, and social studies.1 President Mateos 
made an effort to integrate the Indian, currently comprising 
about 15 per cent of Mexico’s population, into Mexico’s 
cultural and economic life. Through his efforts, Indian 
schools increased from 2,000 in 1958 to 3,900 in 1961.^
These examples of recruitment of more citizens into active 
Mexican society are but a small sample of the total Mexican 
scene. In transitional societies the ever:, increasing indus­
trial and urban population, trying to gain access and seek 
their objectives through political activity, have influenced 
the make-up of political parties. That Mexico is in tran­
sition is apparent. Peasants from rural areas are flocking 
to cities and towns. Mexico, since 1900, has changed from
■'■"Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 3 
(May, 1962), 206. -
'̂’Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 1 
(March, 1962), 16.
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a country in which the rural population was 90 per cent to a 
country in which the rural inhabitants make up 54 per cent of 
the country's population. A United Nations survey predicts 
that by 1980 Mexico will be even more urban with 62 per cent 
of its population located in the cities.
Mexico City has added two million citizens to her 
population since 1940 and the number of cities with over 
100,000 people rose to nine in 1950.2 This exodus from the 
rural area has been caused by lack of land and employment and 
by the promise of work in industrial centers. Although slums 
and low living conditions have come with the mass migration 
to the cities, the cities have been offering a new type of 
life to the workers add have introduced them to the factors 
of transition and modernization. As social mobilization 
continues, people, becoming more dependent upon government 
services and political decisions, often seek to articulate 
their interests by increasing their political participation.^
The new way of life sets a higher value on 
economic and social success, both pf which may be 
identified with political activity and certainly can 
be increased by organization of and action through^
i New. York Times, June 24, 1962, Section VI, p. 24.
O‘"Scott, op. cit., p. 481.
3Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political
Development," American Political Science Review, LV, No. 3
(September, 1961), 499.
4Scott, o£. cit., p. 50.
-54-
special interest groups* Urbanization, therefore, 
is a vital ally of Westernization in making Mexicans 
aware of government and in broadening the base upon 
which Mexico’s government rests.1
By broadening its base of political participation, 
Mexico appears to become more democratic in its represen­
tation; yet there are other factors which also seem to show 
that Mexico is democratizing. As mentioned, the party has 
become institutionalized and through its machinery of com­
mittees and sectors it has been able to reach out and allow 
more and more participation from the grass roots elements.
It is of crucial importance that the party offers democracy 
within its own ranks; this can be noted in the active com­
petition among the sectors for legislative seats and gov­
ernment favor.2
Professor Fitzgibbon, by the use of specialized 
techniques of IBM computers which provide ranking on com­
posite scores, sought to measure the extent to which Latin 
American countries are democratic. In his questionnaries, 
he asked about freedom of speech, press, assembly, and the 
responsibility of the government to its citizens. Out of 
the total of twenty nations, Mexico rose from a rank of 
seventh in 1956 to fifth in 1960. And among nations with a 
noticeable amount of Indian background it rated first.^
1IMd.
pBotsford, op. cit., p. 39.
3
Howard F. Cline, Mexico: Revolution To Evolution 
(New York: Oxford University Press’̂ 1962), p. 172.
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Another indication that Mexico is becoming more demo­
cratic is that the settlement of disputes is not accomplished 
by force but rather by administration and law-enforcement. A 
peaceful succession to leadership positions has evolved and a
fewer as popular leaders of the people are replacing the 
imposed leaders of the past. Caudillismo is being replaced 
by the machinery of the political system; even the rule of the 
president is becoming less personal. The president of Mexico 
is not seen in the role of a charismatic leader, but rather 
in the role of a less personal, semiconstitutional, mechanis­
tic leader who must integrate and synchronize the formal and 
informal machinery of government,.2 This change from personal 
power to power of the political party also resulted in a more 
peaceful transfer of office in elections. It is notable, that 
there have been no armed attempts to resist election outcomes 
since General Saturino Cedillo1s unsuccessful attempt .in
1938.3 In the 1964 presidential elections there was not a
major uprising or demonstration and for the first time the 
opposition candida±e formally conceded the election.4
wider participation in policy formation is apparent.
Local and state political bosses (caciques) are becoming
(October, 1964), 688.
■'"Needier, pp. cit.. p. 308.
2Scott, op. cit.. p. 246.
3Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 165.
4"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVII, No. 8
Attempts were made in the 1964 elections to reform the 
electoral process and offer some opportunity for minority 
parties to obtain Congressional representation. Minority 
parties gaining 2.5 per cent of the total vote are allowed 5 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies and one additional seat for 
each 5 per cent over the first 2.5 per cent.^ As mentioned, 
this change resulted in the gain of 35 seats in the Chambers 
for the opposition.
In its quest for unanimity, the PRI has begun to guide 
its actions toward a more democratic system. It has sought 
a broader base for popular political participation and has 
begun to listen more to the grass roots element. It has 
allowed interplay and competition within the elements of the 
party. It has started to abandon personal rule and has tried 
to rely upon administration and law-enforcement. And finally, 
it has made an attempt to make elections more democratic.
Interests Within the PRI 
;.;The PRI has tried to incorporate the major interests 
of Mexico into its three party sectors, farm, labor and 
popular.
The inclusion of a Farm Sector within the party seemed 
justifiable for land reform was a major cry of the Revolution. 
Land reform has continued to remain high on the government’s
^New York Times, January 11, 1963, p. 4.
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priority list. Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 stated 
that land belongs to the nation and that the nation continues 
to have jurisdiction over it. When monopolies came into 
existence, the Revolution designated the state to rectify 
them. Three reform approaches were presented; (l) return the 
lost communal holdings to the villages. (e,iido), (2) give each 
family free private plots, and (3) maintain a mixture in which 
haciendas would be allowed to continue to exist but small 
plots of land would be given to the worker to supplement his 
earnings on the hacienda. Administrations have been irreso­
lute as to what method they should use for agrarian reform; 
however, the three preceding approaches have generally con­
stituted the bases for action.1
Mexican presidents from Cardenas through Mateos have 
attempted to satisfy the rural elements by distributing
48.3 million hectares of land among the farm peasant pop­
ulation. (it may be noted that in the Mateos Administration 
alone, 16 million hectares were distributed.) Yet in spite 
of these attempts to satisfy the rural elements, much dis­
satisfaction remains and lately invasions of landless peas­
ants, paracaidistas, onto lands which they claim to be 
rightfully theirs, has taken place. This and other examples
have made the party aware of the rural unrest. President
       1 -■ r -         ■ ■ -
^Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, pp. 209-213.
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Diaz Qrdaz, during his campaign and in his inagural address, 
made it known that the agricultural sector would be a key 
concern of his administration. He recognized the signs of 
unrest in the rural areas as a threat to national equilibrium, 
and pledged himself to rectify these difficulties.^ Diaz t
noted that agrarian reform could not indefinitely satisfy
the peasant's hope for lands because in regions where the
land had been divided such land reform was impossible. He 
urged voluntary cooperation, proper functioning of rural 
groups through village communalism and rejected the concept 
of individualism.2 The party, in previous administrations, 
has realized as had Diaz Ordaz that land distribution is not 
the over-all solution for the agrarian problem and have c 1. 
offered a revised program for agricultural reform: (l) land 
must be distributed on a more rational base, (2) new re­
sources should be created through irrigation and hydraulic 
projects, (3) areas heretofore unexploited should be open 
to colonization, (4) agricultural techniques must be mod­
ernized and be aided by- technical assistance, and (5) pro-" 
duction must be regenerated by providing the small and medium 
size owners with benefits similar to those emjoyed by the
^New York Times. January 22, 1965, p. 54.
2"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No. 8
(October, 1964), 497. ~ ~ r ~
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e.i ido and the small farmer. J-
To help the distribution of land on a more rational 
base, the Agrarian Code of 1949 was passed. This code 
rectified the problem of the distribution of economically 
unproductive small parcels of land (minifundia). It 
stipulated that a minimum of 10 hectares of land must 
constitute an e.iido grant.2 Presidents Mateos and Ordaz 
have complied to this law in their distribution of land.
Since President Camacho's administration, Mexico has 
initiated large scale irrigation;:1 arid' hydroelectric projects. 
Such projects as Tepalcatepec and Papalopan have helped to 
bring the total of cultivated, irrigated lends in Mexico to 
42 million acres. And hydroelectric'installations.such as 
Infiernillo and the Maipaso have bought Mexico's power sys-
Qtern to around 6 million kilowatts.
In an effort to open unexploited areas to coloni­
zation, Lopez Mateos introduced the idea of distributing 
forest lands to the e.iidatarios. Such projects in Durango, 
Guerrero, and Michoacan have proved most successful.4 In
"'‘Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 213.
2Ibid.. p. 214.
3New York Times, January 22, 1965, p. 54
4"Mexico,” Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 5
(July, 1964), 401.
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addition, an attempt to relieve the heavily populated central 
plateau area by encouraging resettlement of farmers in the 
sparsely settled Quintana Roo was instigated by the govern­
ment. J-
The government has tried to improve rural Mexico by 
introducing it to the elements of modernization and technical 
agrarianism. Efforts have been made to train students to 
help fill the need for agrarian technicians. One hundred 
training centers, which will educate 10,000 to 15,000 persons 
annually in new farming techniques, have been established.^
Attempts to introduce light industry into the rural area 
can be seen in the establishment of such projects as the $16 
million cellulose industry in San Luis Potosi and the rope 
making industry in the Yucatan.3 Projects in industry and 
self-community projects have provided many new positions for 
the rural unemployed.
Credit to the eiidos is needed if the elements of 
technical agrarianism are to continue. However, elements 
of corruption have effected the Banco Agrario and the Banco 
Ejidal. To stop injustices in credit. . management,
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 1 
(March, 1962), 16.
2"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 5
(july, 1964), 399.
^Ibid.
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Diaz Ordaz has urged the formation of groups of peasants who 
would watch over credit operations.1
Production of agricultural products has been aided 
greatly by larger agricultural holdings. The government has 
given special assurances of protection from paracaidistas1 
tactics to the larger landholders who were engaged in the 
raising of badly needed crops. To .stimulate cattle-bre'eding, 
large landowners were also protected.2
Thus, it may be noted that in addition to the distri-
?
bution of e.i ido lands, the Mexican government has embarked 
on the five point program previously described. By adopting 
such a program as this five point plan, the government has 
used modern methods and technical means to aid the agrarian 
workers. The party has also been aware of the urban workers 
who are continually evolving as a powerful force in Mexican 
society.
The Labor Sector, as the Farm Sector, has been a part 
of the party since its origin. Article 123 of the 1917 
Constitution has been labor's revolutionary code or its Magna 
Carta, for by it the labor movement gained recognition. Since 
that time, labor although not a captive, has been cJdf.p,endent 
upon government to an extensive degree.
1Ibid.
2Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, pp. 210-215.
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In return for its recognition and acceptance by party 
and government, labor has had to acknowledge certain limi­
tations: (1) it can not engage in all-out warfare against 
industry, and (2) it must not, in an effort to obtain better 
wages and conditions, exert full economic pressures against 
the government. The government weighs the claims of labor 
for better wages against such things as the national con­
sideration of trade balances, export prices or the standard 
of domestic prices and decides from this whether labor is 
entitled to its request. The Minister of Labor is the chief 
consultant for labor in deciding wages or conditions, and 
the policy he imposes must be accepted.^
Although labor is allowed to strike, the Minister of 
Labor determines the extent and range of the strikes.
Lopez Mateos acknowledged labor's right to strike in the 
following statement: "Mexican laws uphold the workers' right 
to strike, and the men |fho govertt Mexico.respect, and will 
demand that others respect this right, when it is legiti­
mately i n v o k e d . But Mateos added that the workers should 
strike inside the law and that demonstrations outside the 
law were betraying the working class.
1Ibid.. p. 226.
2Ibid., p. 227. citing, "The Labor Policy of Lopez 
Mateos' Administration in the Government of Mexico, a brief 
speech . . . July 29, 1959 ( Mexico, 1959 )."
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Mexican labor disputes are mostlycsoMeditirlitfioutoise^ieas 
or prolonged strikes. A period which exemplifies the con­
ciliatory method was noted when Lopez Mateos, prior to his 
election as president in 1958, was Minister of Labor. At 
that time, 60,000 labor disputes were settled without a sig­
nificant strike.^- But shortly after his resignation, a series 
of wild-cat strikes took place that continued on through the 
elections of 1958 and finally had to be subdued with forceful 
measures. Since that period, however, there have been no 
major demonstrations. Lopez Mateos as president could boast 
that from 1959-1960, out of a total of 1,437 threatened :
pstrikes only fourteen were consummated.
The government has aided labor by extending benefits 
of social security, unemployment compensation, old age and 
survivors insurance. It has also helped to set minimum wages, 
and has succeeded in getting labor a share of the profits of 
industry.3 An illustrative example of this is a recent law 
passed by Congress which introduced a new sharing plan that 
would permit workers to share in company profits. A national 
commission comprised of officials from labor, management and 
government would be established to decide the amount of
^Taylor, op., cit., p. 726.
^Cline, loc cit.
^Brandenburg, pp. cit., pp. 233-234.
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profit which labor would be allowed to share. It was also 
the duty of this commission to exempt certain industries or 
companies from this profit sharing for a limited time. Or­
ganized labor regarded the new sharing plan as the fulfill­
ment of a long awaited dream. The same Congress also ini­
tiated the labor reform which prohibited child labor under 
fourteen years of age.̂ -
Within the Labor Sector, the CTM, by far the largest 
of the unions, has since 1941 shared its political spoils 
and offices with the lesser unions in the section. This 
benevolent attitude may, however, be nothing more than an 
attempt* of the official party and the CTM to keep minor 
unions staisfied so they will not affiliate with opposition 
parties.^
The Popular Sector has surpassed the other two sectors, 
numerically and in political strength. This can be attrib­
uted' to the fact that it is the Popular Sector which repre­
sents the middle class. Since 1940, this class, as a by­
product of industrialization and urbanization, has risen to 
constitute about 20 per cent of the population.3 Authorities 
have observed that the class structure of Mexico is affected
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 1 
(March, 1962), 15.
2Brandenburg, p|>* cit., pp. 228-229.
3Richard N. Adams, et. ajL. Social Change In Latin 
America Today (New York: Harper & Brothers, 196DX p« 336.
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by modernization. Glass polarization is evident at the top 
with the aristocrats arid at the bottom with the primative 
Indian; however, it is the middle class that is in the process 
of transition. It is within this flexible, elastic, class 
structure of the middle class that the greatest amount of 
social mobilization is taking place.
Urban class stratification is more fluid and although 
there is a discernable distinction between the highest and 
lowest classes within the urban society, there is a vagueness 
as to where lines can be drawn in regards to the middle c.  ̂
class.^ Within this class there is greater opportunity for 
social mobility, It is this class which realizes the quest 
for more formalized organization that often gives rise to 
more voluntary groups. On the whole, these voluntary as­
sociations of society are supported by middle class persons 
who show a basic social stability and it is the middle class
of society to which the urban region relies for leadership 
3and stability.
Urbanization has brought a tendency for the formation of 
voluntary groups.^ Floyd Dotson, in his study of Guadalajara,
^Borah, ojo. cit.. p. 388.
2Alvin Boskoff, The Sociology of Urban Regions 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962j^ pp. 194-196.
^Ibid.. pp. 172-189.
^Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 349-350.
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found that appearance of voluntary organizations was corre­
lated with the urban growth of the last fifty years and that 
there was in general a direct relationship between socio­
economic status and participation. Membership affiliation 
was most often seen in the upper and middle classes.-*-
Consequently, it can be deduced from these studies that 
within transitional Mexico, a middle class is emerging. It 
is this class that is becoming active in Mexican society by 
forming voluntary associations and by rising to the fore to 
lead and stabilize the Mexican nation. Thus the importance 
of the inclusion of this middle class into the Popular Sector 
should not be overlooked.
The high degree of political activity of the Popular 
Sector's middle class provides a link among conflicting 
groups; it is necessary to the function of a complex, modern 
society. The middle class continues to advance because of -|ts 
political initiative and ability compared to the general 
apathy found in the lower classes and the mass. The middle 
class is progressively growing in importance; cultural change, 
social mobilization and political recruitment will bring peo­
ple from the mass into the middle class. The Popular Sector 
will correspondingly expand to be used as the main political
I ' ; : ~ 1 ~
Floyd Dotson, "A Note On Participation In Voluntary 
Associations In A Mexican City," American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 18, No. 4 (August, 1953), 380-381.
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mechanism of the small town and urban middle class to obtain 
their objectives and to manipulate the political process. It 
is stated that the middle-class is the core of the Popular 
Sector. Within the last few years, the Popular Sector has 
emerged as the most powerful of the three PRI sectors and has 
come to equate in political power the combined interests of 
the farm and labor sectors.
The Popular Sector has become politically powerful for 
numerous reasons. As previously mentioned, it has begun to 
represent the middle class which is at present constantly 
expanding in importance. It has, through numerical repre­
sentation, exceeded the other sectors in almost every federal 
organization and has achieved a clear majority among party
Omembers in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. And finally, 
it has had within its ranks the government bureaucrat!s union, 
the FSTSE. The advantageous position which this and the other 
middle class interest groups enjoy within the Popular Sector 
encourages them to support the status quo.
It may be of particular interest to note the benefits 
the FSTSE has received from the government. In the period 
of 1952-1958, over 300,000 government bureaucrats were given 
special advantages in the form of year-end bonuses, cost- of- 
living grants, and raises which totaled over 75 million
^Scott, op. cit., pp. 82-83.
2Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 281.
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dollars. In addition, low-cost housing, their own hospital 
and a 50 per cent rebate on drugs were provided.-1 Scholar­
ships, and trips abroad were also given to FSTSE members.^
The CNOP, as the political organization of the Popular 
Sector, has been the most successful of the three sector or­
ganizations .in' obtaining its objectives for its middle class 
membership.
John J. Johnson observes that the Revolution has shifted 
from left of center to right of center and finally rests on 
dead center. He explains that these adjustments have been 
made with ease because of the steadying influence of Mexico’s 
middle groups.3 Needier also notes the ascension of power of 
the Popular Sector and its middle class and has stated that 
this development has tended to reenforce the position of 
moderation which has been reflected in the actions of presi­
dents Gortines and Mateos. The seats of the Popular Sector 
in Congress have been most often assigned to lawyers who 
continue to take a conservative stand in vi-ew of the middle 
of the road views of the middle class.^
"̂Scott, op. cit. , p. 81.
OBrandenburg, op., cit.. pp. 279-280.
3Scott, op. cit., p. 90.
4John J. Johnson, "Middle Groups In National Politics 
in Latin America," Hispanic American Historical Review.
XXVII (August, 1957), 318.
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Although the party has ridden the center line, it has 
in its intra-party relations, granted concessions to groups 
to the right and to the left in its quest for unanimity. As 
a whole, however, the extreme groups within the party have 
served as scouting parties which have helped to relate to 
the party the current strength and support that the left and 
right elements enjoy. The degree of support that these r 
groups obtain from "public opinion" or uncommitted groups 
within the party aid the party in the determination of its 
course. ̂
In Mexico PRI is the source of all political power;
PRI, that conglomeration of rightists, leftists, 
business men, and union bosses rivited together by , 
realpolitik. The President and crushing majorities 
of both houses of Congress are always members of the 
PRI. ' Thus, the real struggle between the Right and 
the Left goes on, more or less silently but none the 
less grimly, inside the PRI--not at the polls. What 
happens at the polls is a foregone conclusion, with 
minor modifications.
Interests Outside the PRI 
The party is aware not only of the dangerous pressures 
that exist within it but also of the external forces. Con­
sequently the daily operation of government in Mexico in­
volves a process of consultation, conciliation and compro­
mise between the formal political structure of the PRI and 
the "outside" interests.' The party has tried to embrace
"^Botsford, gja. cit. . p. 15.
^David L. Graham, "The Rise of the Mexican Right,"
Yale Review. LII, No. 1 (October, 1962) 110.
-70-
these outside interests and has attempted to show them that 
their needs will be best served by submitting to the PRI.-1- 
This point was clarified in one of President Mateos’ falksc 
when he stated, "The minority as well as the majority has a 
right to its opinion, to discussion and to vote; but only 
the majority has the right to decide."2 The party often 
seeks to absorb the opposition at the lower levels where
A
disputes are local and can be resolved before discontent 
spreads or at the higher levels the opposition is given re­
sponsibility, resoonsabilizar. rather than excluded.3
Although opposition parties have a legal: right;to 
exist and can, with the approval of the Secretaria de 
Gobernaclon, register as a national party, they have not 
to date presented any serious challenge to the PRI. Gen­
erally, the PRI has been successful in absorbing or neu­
tralizing such opposition parties. For example, in the 1964 
presidential election, two out of the three legally recog-' 
nized opposition parties supported the PRI presidential can­
didate.
The parties which were registered in the 1964 election, 
besides the PRI, were the Partido de AcciSn Nacional (PAN),
"̂ "Raymond Vernon, The Dilemma Of Mexico * s Development: 
The Role of the Private and Public Sectors (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1963), 14.
2■Botsford, loc. cit.
3 Ibid.
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the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicana (PARM), and 
"the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS).
The Partido de Acci^n Nacional, a conservative, rightist 
party, is the strongest opposition to the PRI. Since its 
formation in 1939, the PAM has held the second highest po­
sition in elections. Large industrialists, businessmen, and 
pro-clerical elements comprise its membership. It has sup­
ported the Church in its campaign'against communism. .If in 
power, the PAM would rescind the anti-clerical provisions of 
the Constitution of 1917, favor private foreign capital over 
public foreign capital, and would replace the eiido, which 
it regards as inefficient, with large scale privately owned 
units.
In the 1958 elections, the PAN blamed the PRI for every 
conceivable ill and campaigned with vigor, but took an 
extremely pious Catholic stand which repelled many conserva­
tives-. This, plus the factor that many businessmen who were 
normally inclined to vote for PAN voted for the PRI, caused 
the PAN to lose much of its conservative support and made it 
clear that it could not secure power. (it was noted that in 
this 1958 elections businessmen, in many cases, voted for the 
PRI. Two reasons were attributed to this change: (1) the PRI 
had taken a rightward swing which attracted the interests of
^“Mexico," Hispanic American .Report, XVII, No. 9
(November, 1964), 691.
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the conservatives and, (2) many men who had been revolu­
tionaries and PRI supporters were now in influential po> 
sitions in the business community.
In the 1964 presidential campaigns, the PAN existed 
as the only legally active opposition to the PRI. The 
PAN's presidential candidate, Jose Gonzalez Torres, did not 
make criticisms of the economic and political nature of the 
PRI regime but confined himself to broader themes such as 
anti-communism and a "fuller democracy.
However,in the 1964 elections the PRI candidate, D/az 
Ordaz was identified as a moderate, conservative and an anti­
communist and again the PRI cut into the votes of the PAN for 
many conservatives, for the first time, cast their votes for 
a PRI candidate when they supported Diaz Ordaz. The nomi­
nation of Ordaz plus such party inclinations towards the 
right as handing Mexico’s shipyard over to private business, 
refusing to let the telephone workers strike, deporting 
foreign leftists, suppression of domestic communism, estrange­
ment from Cuba and close economic and diplomatic relations 
with the United States seemed to indicate that the‘Mexicpn 
political pendulum was swinging toward the right. Indicative
■̂ Taylor, ojg. cit., pp. 741-742.
2"Mexico,*1 Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 4 
(June, 1964), 302.
3Graham, ojo. cit. , pp. 103-107.
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of the conservative leanings of Ordaz were the events of 
April 1965 when communist demonstrations in protest of the 
United States’ policy toward Vietnam were broken up by the 
government. Following this, the Mexican Communist Party 
headquarters, and two other leftist organizations, the ! ... ' i
Popular Electoral Front, and the Independent Campesino 
Central’s offices, were raided.̂
The 1964 election saw the rise of extra-legal rightist 
parties. The militant, reactionary, conservative groups the 
Frente Patriota de Mexico and the Uni<jn Nacional Sinarquista 
appeared, but gained little strength except in the states of 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Queretaro, Puebla and San 
Luis Potosi. Two new Christian Democratic parties appeared 
but were injured by an ideological split. The rightist 
Partido Democratico Cristiano requested annulment of the 
anticlerical parts of the 1917 Constitution and demanded that 
parents be allowed to educate their children as they wanted, 
the more liberal of the two parties, the Movimiento Social 
Derm/crata Cristiano. really a pressure group rather than a 
party, rejected capitalism and communism, believing that they 
were materialistic, and called for society to organize along 
the line of Christian precepts.2
^New York Times. April 15, 1965, p. 16.
p"Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No. 8
(October, 1964), 691.
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The FARM was created in 1954 by members of the PRI who 
were discontented with the policies of Aleman and Ruiz 
Cortines. This group, claiming to be supporting the true 
revolutionary ideals, has been ineffective by making little 
effort to organize, to strengthen its bargaining position or 
to enlarge its membership, and has become slightly more than 
an arm of the PRI. Although the PARM sponsored some congres­
sional candidates; it supported olaz Ordaz candidacy by 
casting 43,685 votes for him.-*-
The PPS was formed in 1947 when communist labor leader 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano broke from the PRI. The PPS has 
been a leftist orientated party. It originally was comprised 
of a coalition of liberals, socialists, and communists. In 
the 1952 election with Toledano as its presidential candidate 
it made a notable showing, but since that time it has dwin­
dled. Intraparty friction among its coalition, and in, par­
ticular the argument between straight^Hne-communists', who 
wished to turn the PPS into an- orthodox communist party and 
the moderate communists, such as Toledano who wanted to keep 
it more general, have caused the PPS to remain in a weak 
position.^ in 1958 the PPS backed Lopez Mateos as its choice 
for president and in 1964 Toledano told his members not to
^Ibid., p. 6 8 8.
2Scott, op. cit.. pp. 189-192.
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t 1worry since "all will be well if we support Diaz Ordaz."
It seems as though the PPS is a "fellow traveler with the
PRI as well as with the Communists." To repay the PPS, the
PRI rewarded it with patronage and direct subsidies.^
Although the PPS did not receive the necessary 2.5 per
cent of votes cast to gain seats under the new electoral
code, leftists deputies helped it and the PARM to obtain
congressional seats, ten for the PPS and five for the PARM.
The PAN was granted twenty seats. The importance of these
congressional seats was not in the political opportunity or
access they presented to the opposition parties, but rather,
they served as honorary bestowals and a mark of prestige.4
In the eyes of the PRI, they were a token of acknowledgement
for the sake of preserving power in its quest for unanimity.
In an attempt to emphasize the unity of the nation 
and the reconciliation of the loyal opposition into the 
Revolutionary fold, the arrangements for the presenV 
tation of the speech were such that every group to ac­
company the President was composed of leaders from the 
Partido Popular Socialists (PPS) Partido Acci6n Nacional5
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8 
(October, 1964), 687.
^Martin C. Needier, "Changing the Guard in Mexico," 
Current History XLVIII. No. 281 {January, 1965), 28.
3Ibld.
4"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII,, No. 8 
(October, 1964), 687.
5"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVII, No. 9
(November, 1964), 782.
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(PAN), and the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion 
Mexicana (PARM), as well as newly elected represen­
tatives from the official Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI).
At this same tifae President Diaz Ordaz physically l j A. 
embraced Vicente Lombardo Toledano, head of the PPS and 
newly elected Deputy. Such a gesture could be viewed that 
the regime of Diaz Ordaz would strive to maintain good 
relations with the moderate left. Indications from the 
last few months of Mateos’ administration suggested this.2 
President Mateos’ loose interpretation of the electoral 
reforms, his release from prisons of communist artist.
David Alfaro Siqueiros ■, and his decision to vote against 
the recommendation of the OAS conference and continue dip­
lomatic relations with Cuba seemed to be eoncilatory meas-
e
ures towards the moderate left.3
Extra-legal leftist parties presented themselves in 
the 1964 elections. These parties, not being approved by 
the Secretaria de Gobernaci6n. can pot appear on the ballot, 
but do run write-in candidates. The Frente Electoral del 
Pueblo (FEP) and its peasant associate, the Central Campesino 
Independiente (CCI), the most aggressive and extreme of 
leftist intellectuals. The Communist Party of Mexico (PCM)
1Ib id .
2Ib id .
3Ib id .
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remained small with about 5,600 members and stayed aloof 
from local and national elections. Disturbances arose in 
the party between the Moscow elements and the militant 
element represented by two groups, the Trotskyists and the 
followers of the Chinese Communist line. The PCM realized 
that if it did not repress its militant sectors, it may well 
be strongly suppressed by the anti-communist Diaz Ordaz.
The preceding factors seem to confirm the belief that one of 
the lessons of the 1964 campaign was that the far left con­
tinues to be weakened by its division over tactical questions 
and by progressivism of government policies, and remains of 
small numerical significance.2
It appears that the official party, the PRI, is main­
taining its middle of the road position, vacillating between 
the left and the right, yet at all times repfelling extremist 
movements of either side. The legally recognized opposition 
parties of the 1964 elections were of a moderate nature and 
the PRI’s amending the electoral laws so they could obtain 
seats in Congress could be interpreted that the PRI's goal 
is to incorporate all interests of Mexican society, even if 
they may be the opposing parties.3
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 8 
(October, 1964), 691.
2Needier, "Changing the Guard in Mexico,", p. 28.
3Ibid.
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One of the major groups that exists outside the ranks 
of the official party is the Roman Catholic Church. It is 
forbidden by the Constitution of 1917 to participate legally 
in politics, but in recent years, it has been regaining much 
of its pre-revolution prestige and has voiced its opinion on 
matters. This rejuvenation can be attributed to several 
factors. Mexico’s people are 97 per cent Catholic and have 
a built-in prejudice for, not against, the Church. Several 
of Mexico’s recent presidents have publically announced that 
they are believers. The Church has used its new freedom 
to agitate against communism and Castro and has served as 
a brake against the government’s leftist orientation.
However, the greatest percentage of Catholics realize 
that the temporal power of the Church is secondary to that 
of the party. And the majority of the populace, even if a 
prelate advocated the joining of an opposition party, would 
not leave the PRI for:
The bulk of the population knows that an ©position 
party , in power, may give them nothing, while the PRI- 
nominated government has given much in the form of 
material benefits.-’-
The government, although having the material advantage 
is, nevertheless, aware of the influence of the Church and 
has made concessions to pacify this main institutional in­
terest group of Mexican society. In 1961, when it appeared 
that the Mexican government was unduly sympathetic with the
-*-Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 291.
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Left and Castro, the Church staged a series of demonstrations; 
this and other factors led to the Mexican government’s issu­
ance of the statement of incompatibility, which states that \ 
the communist doctrine is not compatible with the democratic 
ideology of Latin American states. Shortly after, a number 
of intellectual communist agitators were arrested, and as 
previously mentioned , there was a general campaign against 
the leftist extremes in Mexico. In June of 1965, the gov­
ernment arrested communist student demonstrators who were 
actively campaigning against the Church in anti-Catholic out­
bursts in Puebla. Police were posted at all Puebla Catholic 
schools to thwart any reprisal action by university students 
against the Church.-1- The government has also attempted to 
gain Church support by a loose interpretation of the anti­
clerical provisions of the Constitution of 1917. Clergy are 
allowed to appear in clerical dressparochial schools can be 
maintained, and seminaries are permittted.
The role of the military has been reduced to the degree 
that it is no longer a major institutional interest group.
Mexico has been able to rid itself of the plague 
of militarism. A quarter-eentiury ago no Latin American 
army was more political than the Mexican; today the 
armed forces are virtually out of politics.2
^The Register. July 9, 1965, p. 1.
2Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 101.
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The military, coming from a public education and most 
often a middle class or lower class environment generally 
sympathizes with the PRI. It is observed that the current 
military wins its battles through legislation*'1' Six members 
of the military are active in the Chamber of Deputies; five 
are members of the Popular Sector and the other belongs to 
the Farm Sector. Ten senators, members of the Popular Sector, 
are military members* The chances of a military revolt are 
unlikely, since the career attitude of the officers, the 
troops’ reservist nature, and the abolition of the practice 
of generals taking their troops with them upon transfer 
leave little opportunity for a revolt*2 It can be noted that 
after the military sector was dropped from the PRI in 1943, 
most of its members affiliated with the Popular Sector, and 
have been incorporated into the PRI.
Although the party-government has been limited by its 
pledge to agrarianism, it has nevertheless sought in some 
measure to pacify the large landholders. The government* 
realizing that large scale and increased production of 
agricultural products is necessary for feeding the ever in­
creasing population, has urged large-landholders to resume 
their large scale production. Tax concessions, credit and 
other incentives have encouraged owners to. cultivate their
^Brandenburg>^op. eft*. p. 295.
2Ibid.. p. 295-296.
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lands for the first time since the Cardenas administration, 
The newspapers of Mexico remain free and independent. 
Even though the government controls the allocation of news-
iprint, publishers feel they enjoy freedom of press and have 
not complained about the quantity of newsprint they have 
received. Extreme elements to the left and right are allowed 
to publish their own literature which often criticizes the 
government. And even conservative papers such as Mexico f j... 
City’s large daily El Excelsior publish editorials which 
criticize the government. The government controls news­
papers only in the indirect sense that is is the foremost 
advertiser and has the financial ability frequently to buy 
large scale advertisements which promote government policies.^ 
The business and industrial groups exist outside the 
PRI structure. Urbanization, industrialization, population 
concentration, specialization, technology, specialized in­
terests, accelerated developments in foreign commerce, and an 
optimistic attitude toward investment in Mexican economy have 
contributed to the rise and importance of trade associations 
in Mexico. Laws of 1936 and 1941 made it obligatory for 
industry and chambers of commerce to form into clmaras.3
1Ibld.. p. 303
%bid.. p . 304.
3Frank. R. Braddenburg,’Organized Business In Mexico," 
Inter-American Economic Affairs. XII (Winter,1958), pp. 29-30.
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These camaras (federations) make it possible for the 
government ministries to deal with business collectively and 
affords government the opportunity to consult and learn the 
attitudes of business before legislation is introduced.-*•
There are two main chambers, the Confederation of 
Industrial Chambers of Mexico (COCAUIIN), and the Confederation 
of National Chambers of Commerce (CONCANCO).
The purpose of these chambers, according to law, 
is to resolve the special problems concerning business 
interests, to encourage the development of business in 
general and the several branches thereof in particular, 
and to institutionalize the inter-relations of business 
and government.2
The CONCAMIN was founded in 1917 and put under govern­
ment control by Cardenas in 1937. The CONCAMIN aggregates 
the interest of its fifty-one chambers. The collective 
weight of these chambers represents virtually all major 
Mexican industry. The government consults CONCAMIN for the 
view of private industry on legislation, administrative regu­
lations , and on state operated industries.3 By tax 
exemptions, a protectionist tariff, direct import control, 
credit, and subsidies the government has sought to aid
■^Brandenburg, ‘'Mexico: Experiment in One Party 
Democracy," , p. 298.
^Brandenburg, "Organized Business in Mexico,", 
pp. 29-30.
^Ibid.
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industry in Mexico.'*' The CONCANACO, the Mexican Chamber of 
Commerce, has two hundred and fifty-four chambers. Besides 
conferring with the government, it articulates its interests 
through conferences on taxation, tariffs, and price controls.2 
In addition to the CONCAMIN and the CONCANACO, there are 
private national trade and commercial groups. These groups 
seek access to government and articulate their interests 
through the presidential offices and commissions. Some of 
the more important are : the Bankers Association, the Mexican 
Association of Insurance, trade groups of mixed nationalities, 
specialized trade associations, small business interests and 
fraternal groups of business.3
It must be noted, however, that within the business 
groups of Mexico there is a distinct division between the 
old industrialists and the new group.
The old group is divided into three factions; (l) those 
who were important economic groups in Mexico before World 
War II, (2) those industrial groups which are connected with 
American capital, and (3) those small, local, handicraft 
industries. These older manufacturing firms find alliances 
in the larger business community of the leading commercial 
institutions and banks of Mexico. The old group welcomes
■'"Sanford A. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 195077 PP» 29-30.
2Brandenburg, ''Organized Business in Mexico,", p. 38.
^Ibid.. p. 42.
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governraent intervention in measures such as tariffs but 
objects to comprehensive action by government in economics.,
It fears that government might take over private business 
interests and thus opposes a working alliance between gov­
ernment and business.-*-
The new group, comprised of small manufacturing plant 
owners, came into existence during World War II. This group 
of nationalistic industrialists stepped in to fill the void 
of imports of consumer goods. The new group relies upon its 
own initiative for technical direction and uses Mexican 
capital for investment. It claims Mexico for the Mexicans 
and anticipates the time when Mexico is self-sufficient in 
the production of consumer goods. It has sought to mobilize 
Mexicans in the process of modernization by supplying them 
with the techniques of modernization, new wants and pur­
chasing ability.2
The new group looks to the government for tariff, import 
and export protections. It believes that the industrialists 
and the government , with the cooperation of labor, should 
work together on a program for the industrialization of 
Mexico. It visualizes continuous contact ajnd cooperation 
between government agencies and industrial groups and be­
lieves the mechanism for this program is the camaras de
'*'Mosk, op. cit., pp. 24-30.
2Cline, United States and Mexico, p. 335.
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industria.-"The point of view of the New Group can probably 
best be summed up by saying that they consider the government 
to be a necessary ally for the growing industries of Mexico,".
Business in general support the status quo and "Mexican 
business prefers a stable nation and , accordingly, at least 
passively supports the PRI and actively supports the gov­
ernment.
It is noted that the PRI has sought to absorb and 
adjust outside opposition parties, and interests. The 
balancing of diverse interests has been particularly evident 
in Mexican economics.
PRI and Mexican Economics 
From 1940, the balanced approach has taken root in 
Mexican economics. Since that time, the middle class as 
guardians of the Revolution have related the progression of 
Revolutionary ideals to industrialism; they have placed 
emphasis on Mexico's industrialization to the extent that 
industry and agriculture have formed a partnership.^
"Fields, as well as factories, form part of the industri­
alizing,. process, as Mexican policy-makers see it."4
u. ■ . . . o
farms must provide the needed domestic market for goods;
%osk, op. cit.. pp. 29-30
O Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party 
Democracy,", p. 300.
3Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 232.
4 Ibid.. p. 233.
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they must raise raw materials for the factories, and they 
must exist to feed the nation. In turn, industry helps the 
agrarian element by purchasing their products, by providing 
work for the displaced rural workers, and by producing modern 
manufactured goods that will aid in the modernization of 
rural areas.̂
Another co-partnership exists between government and
business. Government and business do not compete, but rather
cooperate. Government has the primary responsibility for
setting the economic stage and business supplements it.
Government does not plan industrialization, but 
makes it possible by other developmental functions; 
communications, irrigation, electrification, 
priorities of tax exemptions for needed industries 
(to attract private investment), flexible and 
sympathetic tariff policies. Government and business 
are partners, sharing the common goal of increased 
production and productivity.2
Lopez Mateos confirmed this view in a speech before 
the Confederaci^n de Camaras Industriales in which he 
pointed out ‘that multifarious fields were open to invest­
ment and urged private business to increase their invest­
ments; the activities of the public sector and the private 
sector should be complementary and not competitive.3
Government plays an important part in Mexican economy.
It has almost absolute control over the establishment of
^Ibid.
2Ibid.
3"Mexico,” Hispanic American Review, XV, No. 3
(May, 1962), 206.
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tariffs, fixation of import controls, money supply, subsidies, 
exemptions from taxes, and labor legislation. Besides 
directing the private sector, it has, through its public 
sector, acquired control of the largest fronts of credits, 
either by direct ownership or by owning the most shares in 
semi-autonomous agencies. Heavy government control is seen 
in industries that are basic to the economy, such as rail­
roads, hydroelectric projects, petroleum, steel mills, air­
lines, and the manufacturing of automobiles. The technical 
and financial support has been channeled through the gov­
ernment’s chief development corporation, National Financiers. 
National Financiers became important in 1941 when it began 
to sponsor projects to replace wartime shortages in indus^ c 
tries such as iron, steel, caustic soda, rayon, yarn, and
pulp. During the years 1946 to 1948, it became engaged in
’ f  .projects in iron, steel, textiles, pulp, and paper, cement, 
electric and chemical industries. But in 1950 its primary 
attention was upon the promotion of new industries; trans­
portation and communications, electrical power and consoli­
dation of established industries. National Financiera has 
sought to concentrate in areas where lack of capital has 
existed and has, thus, alleviated shortages which would have 
hampered the further development of industry.1 An example
^The Combined Mexican Working Party, The Economic 
Development of Mexico. A Report to the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (Baltimore; The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1953), pp. 78-79.
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of National Financiers'$ aid can be seen in the sugar 
industry. After the war, when sugar imports were absorbing 
progressing amounts of foreign exchange, National Financiera 
invested heavily to add to the Mexican sugar industry's 
capacity.I National Financiera's importance has increased 
for it is the only agency authorized for negotiating foreign 
loans, principally from the United States Export-Import 
Bank and the World Bank.2 National Financiera approaches 
its duties, in a flexible manner. It may revamp a weak cor̂ e : 
cern to make it pay. It may begin with a new project 
bringing together Mexican entrepreneurs, and foreign invest­
ment, Or it may use the approach of "mixed" companies in 
which Mexican capital, foreign capital and the government
National Financiera advocates "free enterprise." Once 
its project becomes stable, it divests itself of its in­
terests by selling it,s stock, replacing it with bonds or 
having arprivatei.thlrfJaparty gain an interest in the business.
Mexico,, because of its economic planning and direction, 
has experienced a steady climb upward in its economic system.
^Ibid.
^Cline, The United States and Mexico, p. 343.
3Ibid., pp. 342-344.
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Cline notes this in the following quote:
The imposing arrays of figures now pouring forth 
strengthen the inescapable conclusions that an economic 
revolution of major magnitude has been taking place for 
a decade and still is in full motion. . . . The salient 
fact is that the upward sweep of production curves, 
graphs of increased participation, carloadings, and all 
the other paraphernalia entailed in economic analysis 
add up to a slowly rising standard of living for the 
Mexican nation which even inflation.and its own in*:  ̂
creasing numbers have not reversed.
Since Mexico began to stress economic progress, it has 
achieved notable growth. Although private initiative played 
an important part, the unprecedented economic growth of 
Mexico between 1939 and 1950 was largely because of the poli­
cies and investment of the Federal Government.2
The 1960’s saw continued progress for Mexico. In 1962, 
Lopez Mateos set forth a three-year plan of economic develop­
ment. This plan, requiring close cooperation between the 
government and private capital, sought, among other things,
to accelerate the growth rate of the Gross National Product
3from 3.5 per cent (1961) to 6 per cent in 1962. Many felt 
that this was too optimistic a goal. However, the next few 
years saw a substantial increase in Gross National Product, 
a six per cent increase in 1963 and a seven per cent increase 
in real terms for 1964. The year 1964 also saw capita income
^Ibid.. p. 333.
2The Combined Mexican Working Party, op., cit., p. 148.
3’Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 5
(May, 1962), 399.
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rise 3 per cent.l
The year 1964 was viewed as unusual, for even though
it was a presidential election year the expected economic
2fall did not take place. The economic rhythm did not be­
come slower but increased. Investors did not wait to know 
the composition of the new cabinet but invested immediately. 
One observer remarked that this trend seemed to be "a bath 
in the Sea of E u p h o r i a . The key word in evaluating the 
year of 1964 was confidence.4
Five reasons were attributed for the unprecedented 
election-year growth. The first reason was that President 
Lopez Mateos announced he would use government funds, if 
needed, to aid increased production. The second reason was 
that the administration carried out fiscal reforms, partic­
ularly in the tax structure. In 1958, there were 700,000 
taxpayers in Mexico , but the 1964 fiscal reforms increased 
this number to 4.5 million. Tax collections were expected to 
reach 1.5,954 million pesos, an increase of 2,150 million 
pesos over 1963*s total. It was thought that Mexico would
^New York Times. January 22, 1965, p. 53.
2This economic fall is not caused from uncertanity 
as to whom the new president will be, for he is always the 
PRI candidate, but rather because of the uncertanity as to 
what the new president's economic policies might be.
3Ibid., p. 54.
4 Ibid.
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impose a personal income tax in the near future and there 
were indications that a progressive rate would end Mexico’s 
standing as a low-tax country for residents.^ Tax reforms 
effective in 1965 provided for the inclusion of the decen­
tralized agencies and government-owned enterprises.2
The general confidence in Mexican economy was the third 
reason for the economic growth of 1964. In that year, 1.4 
million shares of stock were traded on the Mexico City 
stock exchange in the first four months. In 1963, a total 
of 1.6 million shares were sold for the entire year. In 
certain areas, high production resulted in job creation and 
the fostering of local business confidence. Mexico’s National 
Mining Association finished planning the $75 million project 
which would convert San Luis Potosi into an immense indus­
trial and mining complex. One of the most outstanding ex­
amples of confidence was the private Mexican firm, Mexican 
Longoria Enterprises, buying out a major United States com­
pany which was operating in Mexico.3
The fourth reason for the economic prosperity was that , 
owing to higher purchasing power caused by an increase in 
minimum wages and the profit-sharing law, consumers had more
■'■’Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No. 7 
(September, 1964), 595.
2New York Times. January 22, 1965, p. 53. ,
- T - - 3 -T- •/"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 7 
(September, 1964), 595.
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money to spend than before. Under the profit-sharing law 
employees who originally expected to receive $40 million 
now expected to receive double that amount. -1 The govern­
ment has taken particular note of this need for an increase 
in the consumer market. The president of the CEC, Corona de 
Roral, held that the government by its nationalization of 
minerals, railroads, petroleum, and electrical power had
proved the PRI idea of "economic growth with social justice"
2by increasing the masses purchasing p'ower.
The record of foreign loans, on the whole self-liqui­
dating, provided the fifth reason for the optimistic economic 
picture. Private foreign investors invested around $1,500 
million in Mexico in 1963. The United States!share-eomppised- 
about $1,300 million of this. Many foreign firms sought 
Mexican companies which were willing to take in foreign capi­
tal.3 in addition to private foreign capital investment, 
there has been a noticeable increase in private investment by 
domestic firms.
The climate of confidence which prevails in Mexico1, 
its political stability, the monetary and credit meas­
ures and government expenditure on infrastructural 4
o"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 3 
(May,.I960), 206.
3"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVIII, No. 7 
(September, 1964), 596. n
4New York Times. January 22, 1965., p. 53.
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programs have promoted a substantial'.increase in private 
investment and a greater flow of external savings, both 
private and public.^
Private investment represented 54.2 per cent of total 
investment in 1963 and continued at a high level in 1964 
placing emphasis in construction industry, cement, chemicals, 
steel, automobiles and machinery.2
The government has placed great importance upon the 
establishment of a firm basis for the development of a public 
works program. In 1962, it issued a directive to all depart­
ment and government ministries requesting that they draw a 
national plan which would coordinate their actions. The gov­
ernors of the states were also made aware of the new impetus 
in public planning and have joined in developing plans for 
industrialization, transportation, irrigation, and electrifi­
cation. And in public works planning, the government has 
embarked upon a project to incorporate more of Mexico’s 
population into the process and profits of modernization by 
spreading new industries throughout Mexico rather than con­
centrating them around the big cities. The government has 
also composed a list of 600 industrial products which it has 
urged private industry to manufacture, for it feels that 
these listed products are essential to further development.^
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3 ■"Elsworth L. Stinyard, “Getting the Facts in Mexico,"
Mexican American Review. (January, 1962), 29.
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Government shares in the general economic confidence.
In 1964 its budget was 15 per cent higher than that of 1963 
and the 1965 Federal budget totaled $1,428.3 million which 
was an increase of 11.9 per cent over 1964. It appears as 
if Mexican economy is expanding and the general feeling Is 
that of confidence for the future.
: PRI Stability
The preceding pages that dealt with the stability of 
the PRI seemed to conclude that the PRI is resting upon a 
firm base. They predict a bright future for the Mexican 
one party system and support the leaders.* confidence in its 
continuance.
The PRI, by its own political machinery, can extend to 
the whole of Mexican society. Through its committee struc­
ture at the national, state, and local levels, and its sector 
organizations, the PRI is able to feel the pulse..of ■ the ppp- 
ulace and provide them with an institutionalized structure 
through which they can participate in realizing their polit­
ical, economic, and social objectives. Yet it must be noted 
that the centralized nature of this machinery also enables 
the party to maintain a firm control in the chain of command.
The party's identification with the government offers a 
second means through v which it can communicate with and 
direct society. By, its control of the executive, administra­
tive, legislative, and judicial branches at all levels of
^Mew York Tiroes, op. cit.. p. 53.
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government, it is able to set the guide-lines of Mexican 
development and again exist as the main channel through which 
Mexican citizens strive to obtain their goals.
By its identification as the "official party" and the 
party of the Revolution, the PRI has become hallowed to the 
extent that a vote against the PRI is unpatriotic, for it is 
a vote against the ideals and goals of the Mexican Nation.
The party, since its formation in 1929, has maintained 
itself in an unchallengeable! position. It has not only 
represented a majority, but a staggering majority. The PRI 
has beep successful in organizing the main interests of farm, 
labor, and the middle class into its sector organizations and 
it has most often succeeded in incorporating major outside 
interests such as business groups and the Church, and even 
opposition parties into its deliberating process. It presents 
the idea that it is only within this majority ‘that an interest 
group can succeed. This preceding idea seems analagous to the 
United States’ two party system. Over a period of years no 
third party in the United States has been able to poll any
sufficient amount of votes. The voters want to be on the side!
of the winner and it is evident that third parties have little 
chance of being the winner against the power of the estabr 
lished majority. And so it is in Mexico, for the opposition 
parties have little chance in being a winner against the 
established majority, the PRI, which has through the years 
increased its position of power in its attempt to establish 
stability and continuity.
CHAPTER V
PRI AND INSTABILITY
PRI1s Identification with the Government 
Although arguments have been extended as to the stability 
of the Mexican one-party system, elements of instability do 
exist and will be considered in this chapter.
The argument has been advanced that governmental and 
party control are being weakened by the decentralization of 
the governmental process. Decentralization can be especially 
noted in the role of the executive, because the president can 
no longer govern in detail but must allocate responsibility to 
other officials, for the demands of society, actuated by 
industrialization, have multiplied and require more spe­
cialized knowledge. Truly competent administrators are dif­
ficult to find, and, once appointed, their removal is un- . 
likely. Thus these administrators, and also many elected of­
ficials, becoming more independent and acquiring broader areas 
of discretion, are forming political machines which could 
pose a potential threat to the party's control.
"^Padgett, "Mexico's One-Party System: A Re-evaluation," 
pp. 998-999.
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Dissatisfaction with government officials has been 
voiced by Mexicans. Because of the synonymous nature of 
the government and the' party, the citizens’ displeasure is 
a reflection on the PRI.
It has been noted that party members hold most gov­
ernment positions and that often leaders of the various 
sectors have prominent positions in the government depart­
ment which corresponds to their sector. This process has 
been termed polyfunctionalism. Such polyfunctionalism 
often causes the leaders to lose loyalty to the organi­
zation which originally placed them in power and to use 
their new position to acquire personal gain. This has been 
particularly apparent in the Labor Sector. Union leaders 
have often lost view of the interests of their organization 
and have become tools of the government. The strikes of 1958 
and 1959 may have shown dissatisfaction with the PRI con­
trolled leadership.
The demands of the rank-and-file developed out of 
grievances which sprang from the realization that the 
party-union relationship has changed from union sup­
port of the party to party domination of the unions, 
by means of venal leaders. For years it has been so 
obvious that men become leaders of lah?or for personal 
profit and political power that it has been remarked 
openly throughout the country.
"̂Taylor, o£. cit., pp. 738-739.
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The party seems to be confronted by the fact that many 
members place self-interest above the collectivity. Frank 
Tannenbaum observes that "the decline in the personal integ:- 
rity so essential to the new responsibilities thrown upon 
both government and private enterprise . . .  is the greatest 
single moral failure of the Mexican Revolution.
A common saying in Mexico has been that corruption and 
bribery (mordida) have oiled the gears of the party. During 
the mid-twenties to the mid-forties, the three sectors were 
saturated with corruption. For example, labor circulated 
lists with the names of the labor officials and the sums 
expected by the officials if they were to settle a dispute.2 
Graft and corruption also played a part in the period from 
1946 to 1952, the time of President Miguel Alemln.
The Alemln administration was noted for its 
grandiose economic activities. . . .  It also 
became noted later by word of mouth and in the 
Mexico City newspapers for the corruption ac­
companying all of these projects, and for the 
very profitable economic strangleholds reputedly 
held by such men as Jorge Pasquel, with his oil 
distribution monopoly in the capital, . . .  or 
Antonio Daaz Lombardo, who made a fortune in trans­
port and by milking the Social Security Department.
Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and 
Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 80.
2Needier, "The Political Development of Mexico", p. 310. 
^Scott, op. cit.. p. 250.
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Government agrarian institutions, the Banco Aqrario, the 
Banco E.jidal. and the Departamento de Asuntos Aqrarios y 
ColonizacLtfh (DAAC) have allegedly been involved in cor­
ruption concerning the handling of financial grants to the 
e.jidos and have been accused of unjust dealings in the 
distribution of land to the peasants. Often corrupt,minor 
politicians have held positions of authority in the agrarian 
institutions and have allowed large landholders to keep land 
which should be distributed to peasants. An illustrative 
example of such corruption could be seen in the case 
involving the DAAC and the peasants of Toluca, Mexico. In 
Toluca, lands had been granted the peasants since 1940, but 
a close friendship that existed between DAAC officials and 
the ownerso of the latifundios prevented the actual transfer 
of property. Since 1940, the Supreme Court has handed down 
decisions which favored the new e.iidatarios . but threats of 
armed force by the DAAC dissuaded the peasants from taking 
over their land. Finally, in April, 1964, some peasants 
took possession of the Toluca land against the force of the 
DAAC.1
Corruption has caused men to lose faith in the idea of 
the Revolution. Generals Barragan and Tevino, in 1954, 
dismayed with the loss of revolutionary honor and zeal,
1 "Mexico,11 Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 7
(September, 1964), 496.
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particularly during the corrupt Aleman administration, broke 
from the PEI and formed the Partido Autentico de la Revolucion 
Mexicana (FARM), the party which claims to represent the true 
revolutionary goals.
PRI and the Revolution 
Other Mexicans, such as Emilo Portes Gil, David 
Siqueiros, and Marcantonio Diaz Infante, maintain that the 
party has neglected, betrayed and altered the goals of the 
Revolution for its own pragmatic approach.
Many maintain that the agrarian reform program, one 
of the main principles of the Revolution, has been plagued 
by graft and deception. Emilo Portes Gil, for example, notes 
that the benefits of the Revolution are not being distributed 
effectively throughout the entire population, and that thirty 
million live in misery while five million are privileged.2 
The charge of violating the 1917 Constitution was also 
levied by David Siqueiros. He was arrested in March, 1962 
under the Law of Social Dissolution.  ̂ During his trial, he 
condemned the government’s violation of the 1917 Constitution 
in regard to the division of power. He warned that the
^Scott, ojg. cit. , p. 187.
2"Bright Spot In The, Hemisphere," U.S. News and 
World Report, LVI, No. 8 (February 24, 1964), 96-97.
3This law, passed in 1941, intended to apply to 
those persons obstructing government1s aims, is vague and 
has often been interpreted by the State to apply to persons 
expressing disagreement with the regime's policies.
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judiciary and legislative branches were controlled by the 
executive and warned that the future of democracy of Mexico 
was endangered by the development of an autocratic type of 
government.^
On April 17, 1962, the Zapata Movement, led by 
Marcantonio Diaz Infante, petitioned the U.N. General 
Assembly and the Security Council for diplomatic recognition 
as the government of Mexico and for free elections within the 
next six months under U.N. supervision. Among the charges 
against the government were that it had continually withheld 
the freedoms expressed in the Constitution of 1917 and that 
it had deprived the Mexican people of effective suffrage, one 
of the original goals of the Revolution.2
Since the PRI can and does change the definition of the 
revolutionary goals, the Revolution has come to be what the 
regime says it is. An example of this can be seen in the 
PRI’s identification of industrialization with the Revolution, 
for originally industrialization was not mentioned in the 
revolutionary objectives or in the Constitution of 1917. It 
could even be argued that the revolutionaries were fighting
"'’•'Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 3 
(May, 1962), 205.
2"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 4 
(June, 1962), 302.
3Taylor, op. cit.. p. 731.
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against the over-emphasis that Poxfirio D^az had placed upon 
industrialism and his neglect of agrarianism. It is para­
doxical to note that now the pendulum seems to be swinging 
again toward industrialism and away from agrarianism.
Vernon mentions that although the president receives
great majorities, his position is unsteady for there is no
one revolutionary ideology that binds the many splinters
together.^ It was stated that "the universal allegiance
of the leaders of the PRI to the Revolution has only
slightly more substance than the asserted allegiance of
2the United States politician to the Founding Fathers."
Even though general goals such as equitable distribution 
of land and decent labor conditions are connected with 
the Revolution, wide areas are left to the manner, methods 
and timing for the fulfillment of the goals, for the 
interests of the PRI encompass little short of the 180 
degree span of opinion which typifies European parliamentary 
structure.3 it is further noted that all of these splinters 
deserve some measure of access and accommodation'if the<dis- 
sension within the party is to be kept within tolerable 
limits. This question of whether the PRI can continue to 
represent the interests that are emerging in the pluralistic
■̂ Vernon, op,, pit., p. 13. 
2Ibid.. p. 14.
3Ibid.
-103-
society is paramount in the consideration of the party’s 
continuance.
PRI and the Pluralistic Society 
Isaac Deutscher, in his discussion of the Russian one- 
party system, foresees the collapse of the monolithic party 
structure of Russia. He argues that the rising working 
class possesses a potential political power. He states 
that it has only been since the 1950’s that the working 
class has been consolidated as a "modern social force, 
acquiring an urban industrial tradition, becoming aware 
of itself, and gaining confidence.Since this time, 
the working class has sought a new egalitarianism. Here­
tofore, they had found themselves only . nominally equal 
since in their actual position they were subsidiary to 
the ruling groups, the intellectuals, the managerial 
class and the government bureaucrats. Even today, he sees 
the working class as being semiarticulate and limited to 
fragmentary and scattered manifestations. However, the 
workers’ present and potential power is being noticed, and 
the government has tried to pacify them with reform 
legislation.^ Nevertheless, the working class continues 
to emerge as a growing threat to the existing political
^Isaac Deutscher. Russia in Transition (New York: 
Grove Press, Inc., I960), p. 56.
2Ibid., pp. 59-62.
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system. V.O. Key also notes that the working class, along 
with the effects of urbanization, can lead to the disinte­
gration of the one-party system.
Mexican society is experiencing modernization and is 
becoming more pluralistic. As Western economic and social 
conditions begin to operate even more effectively in Mexican 
culture, interest groups may become more competitive and 
complex to the point that the PRI machinery will not be 
able to satisfy them.-*-
If this occurs, it probably will involve multipli­
cation of the specialized interests participating 
in politics, together with a basic change in nature 
of membership in such interest groups, creating 
multiple political motivating forces not now present. 
Certainly the introduction of education, the expansion 
of social sophistication, and the spread of political 
awareness have accelerated the weakening of person- 
alistic relationships and the growth of overlapping 
memberships in interest groups and associations which 
can and do find' themselves in competition on given 
public policy issues.2
The question that arises is whether, as the general 
level of society rises, will the party be able to rise 
with it. "As professional politicians— and, in the wider 
sense, as leaven to an unpolitical mass--the PRI personnel 
are first rate; the question is whether they will be ef­
fective as executors and instruments of a parallel gov- 
ernment in a modern society."
^Scott, op. cit., p. 31.
2Ibid.
3Botsford, op. cit., p. 16.
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The PHI, as any group which broadens its interests, must 
be ready to deal with diverse interests. The inclusion of 
many interests may stimulate dissatisfaction among the 
diverse elements, and "the range of interest included may be­
come so wide as to cause gratification of the policy proposals 
at one terminus of the spectrum to run counter to the aims and 
interests of groupings at the other."-*- There are interests 
and pressures in the country that can no longer be denied, 
and if they are not placated, it may be possible that their 
dissatisfaction could bring about the disintergration of the 
current system. For example, it is observed that at present 
there is a great deal of unrest in the labor and agrarian 
sectors of the PRI. This unrest could be regarded as a
orejection of the PRI’s control over the sector organizations.
Interests Inside the PRI 
If any single area were to be chosen as the most 
unstable spot in the PRI administration, the rural region 
would undoubtedly be it. The agrarian situation currently
t
presents the gravest threat to party stability. The impor­
tance of the agrarian element is obvious; it comprises 50 
per cent of the economically active population; a total of 
60 per cent of Mexico’s exports come from agriculture; and
"^Padgett, "Popular Participation in the Mexican 
One-Party System", p. 270.
^Taylor, cit. , pp. 735-740.
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internal farm production constitutes almost the sole source 
of Mexico's food. However, less than 22 per cent of the 
national income is distributed among the rural population. 
The overpopulated, under-employed rural segment exists, as 
a whole, in a setting of abject poverty with its rural slums 
and hunger for land. Recently, in 1958, the straits of the 
Farm Sector were illustrated with the demonstrations of the 
paracaidistas. The paracaidistas , rural peasants who il­
legally migrated and "squatted" upon large tracts of land, 
held that these estates (latifundios) were in excess of and 
in violation of the maximum land allotment of the agrarian 
reform rules.
These paracaidistas' demonstrations, the hunger 
marches, the alleged corruption of government agrarian 
institutions, and the uneven distribution of income have 
caused the rural sector to emerge explosively as the party's 
major problem.
The great unrest within the rural sector has become 
progressively noticeable in the past few years. The PRI 
leadership, aware of the seriousness of the demonstrations' 
implications, has begun to stress the agrarian sector as a 
primary target for social, economic and political reform.
Yet violence still persists. A few examples from the period
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 6
(August, 1964), 495.
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of 1962 to 1965 give an indication of the bitterness and 
strife that has taken place between the agrarians and the 
government.
In Februrary, 1962, two paracaidistas uprisings 
took place. The most notable was led by Ruben Jararaillo 
who with 3,000 armed peasants occupied 30,000 hectares in 
the state of Morelos; they were dislodged by government 
troops. ̂
May, 1962, was a month of instability and violence 
that began with the brutal murder of Ruben Jaramillo and 
his family. The nation was incensed with the atrocity, 
and the government was implicated in the crime. Near the 
machine-gun riddled bodies of the rural peasant leader and 
his family, empty cartridge shells were found that bore the 
mark of Fabrics Nacional de Municiones, the government 
munitions factory. Furthermore, Army Captain Jose Martines 
was positively identified as the leader of the military group 
which kidnapped the Jaramillo family from their home.^ Also 
in May, some 15,000 peasants of the state of Coahuila, 
seeking an audience with the president, began a hunger march 
to Mexico City. These protestors marched in opposition to
^'Mexico,*' Hispanic American Report, XV, Mo. 5 
(July, 1962), 397.
2Ibid.
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the policy of the government’s La Forestal Company which had 
reduced the price of ixtle, a fiber for coarse rope, and had 
refused to pay back debts. The peasants were on the verge of 
starvation because of these two measures. The government
arbitrator promised a government loan of 20 million pesos
''1
to La Forestal Company so that it could pay all its debts 
and raise the price of ixtle 25 per cent. In the same 
month, Jacinto Lopez, leader of the workers and peasants' 
Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico, (UGOCM) 
threatened to invade large estates unless the administration 
moved faster in Resolving the land reform problem. Lopez, 
an experienced leader in such land invasions, had led a 
series of land expropriations in the states of Baja 
California, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Colima. The government 
warned him that it would not tolerate further demonstrations 
and stated that only the president could parcel out lands 
and redistribute the large estates.^
The following month 1,200 peasants from southern 
Sonora began a hunger march to Mexico City in a demand for 
a solution of agrarian problems in the northwestern states 
of Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Baja California. They protested 
that the government's agrarian agency Departamento de Asuntos 
y Colonizacidn (DAAC) had denied land to more than 100,000
1Ibid., pp. 397-398.
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peasants, and that irrigation waters had been distributed 
unfairly by the government. The march was allegedly led byi
the PPS and the UGOCM, both leftist organizations.^
Peasants from the village of El Huanal in the township 
of Nautila, Veracruz appeared in July, 1962 before the DAAC 
to protest the burning and destruction of their village and 
the slaughter of their livestock and pets by state troopers 
and police. This onslaught was supposedly provoked by two 
latifundio owners who sought to intimidate the villagers 
from seeking the division of their latifundios under the 
agrarian reform laws.^
Land invasions continued and by January, 1963,
5,000 squatters had been dislodged from lands in Durango 
and Chihuahua. An Independent Campesino Central (CCI) 
was formed. The CCI, a leftist organization, issued the 
ultimatum to the government to form an acceptable land 
program before Hay or face nationwide demonstrations.^
In June, 1964, the CCI instigated demonstrations which 
culminated in riots against the presidential candidate,
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 6 
(August, 1962), 494.
2"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XV, No. 7 
(September, 1962), 588.
3New York Times, January 8, 1963, p. 1.
4"Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XVIII, No. 4
(June, 1964), 302-303.
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Diaz Ordaz, and the land reform program,, Letters eame from 
the states of Oaxaca, Michocan, Veracruz, Puebla, Jalicso, 
and Guanajuato to tell of the confusion that existed in the 
eiido communities. These epistles noted the corruption 
existing in the management of the Banco Ejidal which was 
run by minor politicians who often allowed provincial farmers 
to hold land that should have been given to the peasants.^ 
These rural peasants seemed to have no idological 
goals; rather, they were showing their discontent with the 
government for its negligence with regard to the agrarian 
society.
This small, hopless, revolution was a manifestation, 
of their determination to have social and economic - 
change. It was their way of saying that they now want 
more than promises from a one-party ’democratic*' 
government.^
That the Farm Sector was being neglected had been 
apparent in the past. Although the CNC is the largest mass 
organization in Mexico, the eiiditarios and the small farmers 
are by no means a paramount power in Mexico’s political 
process.  ̂ In a 1950 chart breaking down the Mexican working 
foa?ce into class and income per month, it was related that
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Report, XVII, No. 7 
(September, 1964), 496.
2William M. Barbreri , “Is All Progress?" America 
LLVI, No. 47 (Februrary 3, 1962), 581.
^Scott, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
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85.92 per cent of the lower class Mexican workers received 
less than 300 pesos each month while the upper and middle 
class workers received between 300 and 1,000 a m o n t h . T h i s  
uneven distribution is, perhaps, attributed to the political 
ineffectiveness of the agrarian and urban workers and their 
leaders who have not represented them properly.^
In 1957, agriculture constituted 53.5 per cent of the 
economically active population while industry comprised 
16.8 per cent. Yet in the distribution of income, agricul­
ture received 22.9 per cent compared to industry with 34.5 
per cent.^ Even in 1964 with the government’s increased 
agrarian program, the agrarian sector,, composing 50 per cent 
of the economically active population, received less than
22 per cent of the national inpppie.^
\
The Labor Sector has, according to Scott, received in 
comparision to agriculture a higher share of benefits than 
its numbers warrant; it has enjoyed a better standard of 
living; and has very nearly equated the Farm Sector on 
government councils. However, all has not been harmonious
^A peso at this time was equivalent to 12.5 
U.S. Cents.
^Scott, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
3Stinyard, op. cit., p. 28.
4 "Mexico, " Hispanic American -Report, XVII, No. 6
(August, 1964), 495.
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within the Labor Sector. Two major factions have emerged 
within the sector. The CTM and its supporters, comprising 
85 per cent of the Labor Sector's membership make up the 
Bloaue de Unidad Obrera (BUO). The BUO is opposed by 
leftist labor groups which are led hy the Confederacion 
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC). Although 
this anti-BUO labor element received a great deal of sup­
port from the Cortines’ regime, it alienated the govern­
ment with the 1958 and 1959 strikes.-*- Owing to the greater 
strength of the CTM and the government crackdown on the 
leftist labor unions after the 1959 demonstrations, it does 
not seem at present that the left-right factionalism could 
lead to the Labor Sector’s disintegration. But if the anti- 
BUO element could gain by recruitment and equalize the BUO 
in membership, a crisis could occur. In the meantime, 
however, this internecine struggle has handicapped the Labor 
Sector in its position for power.
In reference to the 1958 and 1959 strikes, it was held 
that they indicated that the laborer was tired of having to 
work for the Revolution with little compensation.
^Scott, 0£. cit., pp. 164-168. 
oTaylor, op. cit., p. 739.
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"Nationalistic pride, never edible, becomes a bad condiment 
when overemployed.Union demonstrations voiced the idea 
that government of the past few years had been conservative 
to the extreme of almost being anti-labor and the strikes 
served as warnings for the government to be more generous.
As mentioned previously, the strikes were also interpreted 
as a rebellion of the rank and file of labor against their 
corrupt and PHI controlled labor leaders. The rebellious 
attitude of the unions was expressed in a union resolution 
in 1958 which was passed at a special congress session. This 
resolution held that public office would, in the future, be 
incompatible with union office and that the salaries of the 
union officers would be reduced.^
Both the labor and agrarian sectors have received 
relatively less than the Popular Sector. Although the 
government has sought to aid both withfpublic works programs 
and long range plans, the peasants of the agrarian and labor 
sectors have not realized it. To them aid means direct and 
immediate rectification of their problems.
Ironically, the present instability that is seen within 
the Popular Sector exists because it is receiving too many 
benefits. The FSTSE, the government workers union, receives
"'’Taylor, gjo. cit. , p. 739. 
2Ibid.
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such a high proportion of elective officers and government 
support that some observers wonder whether the Popular Sector 
can remain intact with one of its ten branches receiving such 
extraordinary fa v o r s . T h e  question also arises as to 
whether the Popular Sector’s ten branches can continue to 
envelop the ever-expanding interests of a modern Mexico. It 
is this sector more than any other which must seek to 
incorporate the diverse groups of society.
Although some prognosticators forecast party instability 
because of the splits and divisions within the sectors, 
others believe that the greatest potential threat to party 
stability comes from the sectors* having, as independent 
units, the strength and the ability to break from the PRI and 
form opposition parties.
Can the PRI*s virtual monopoly of Mexican politics 
survive? An examination of the alternative party 
organizations currently available indicates that there 
is no present choice to be made. Yet the sectors 
possess the initiative if they wish to exercise it. 
Labor, on the one hand, and the peasants and farmers, 
on the other, have gained strength . . .  as the result 
of industrialization and population increase . . .  No 
longer junior partners, they are the major props of the 
party . . . Further, both interest groups, incomplete 
though they are at the present time in terms of 
composition, are more experienced in the field of 
political action than most parallel groups which can 
be found in other countries.2
"'‘Scott, op. cit., p. 170. 
^Taylor, ojd. cit. , pp. 743-744.
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PRI and Outside Interests
Threats to party stability are not confined to the 
interests within the PRI but are frequently found in groups 
which remain outside the party’s official ranks. Although 
leftist-provoked demonstrations occur and new left-wing groups 
continue to form,the left does not present a serious threat to 
PRI stability. It is, according to Graham, "orating and 
pamphleteering its way to oblivion."1 Karl Schmitt states, 
"Today, for the most part the Communists are talking to 
themselves, quearreling among themselves, and sometimes
pvoting for themselves." The rightist orientated groups, 
however, being stronger and better organized, constitute a 
potentially greater threat to PRI power. Among the strongest 
of the rightist groups is the Church.
The Church persists as a vital institution in Mexico. 
Statistics indicate that 97 per cent of the Mexicans claim 
to be Catholic and that there are 9 archbishops, 34 bishops, 
6,020 priests, 1,990 seminarists, and 18,560 religious
gsisters.
The potential danger posed by the strength of organized 
Catholic groups is indicated by the following datum. In
^Graham, o£. cit., p. 110.
2Karl M. Schmitt., "Communism In Mexico Today,"
Western Political Science Quarterly (March, 1963), 112.
3Cline, Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, p. 177.
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a study of voluntary associations in the city of 
Guadalajara, it was found that Mexicans in their parti­
cipation in voluntary associations, concentrated their 
membership in Church affiliated organizations. An illustra­
tive example was that 81.7 per cent of women!s membership 
was centered in Church groups.^"
In 1953, the Mexican Legion of Decency, the Knights 
of Columbus, and the Committee for Catholic Action conducted 
a campaign on national morality that culminated in an as­
sembly in which forty-four Catholic organizations, (twenty- 
four secular orders, and twenty pious orders) with 
4,530,743 members, were represented. This assembly made
known the following statistics of Catholic membership 
2divisions:
I. Catholic Organizations * q
A. Catholic Action (Accion Catoliea Mexicans)
1. Mexican Catholic Femine Union
a) urban workers, teachers, and campesinos
b) total membership of 198,052
2. Union of Mexican Catholics
a) total membership of 44,000
3. Catholic Action of Mexican Youth 
a) total membership 18,000
4. Mexican Catholic Feminine Youth
a) women.*s organization between ages of 
fifteen and thirty-five
b) total membership 88,221 3
■ . * . - T i  ' r  • . .-s . t .. '
^Dotson, 0£. cit., pp. 380-381.
OBrandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party 
Democracy,", p. 291.
3Ibid., p. 292.
-117-
B. National Union of Heads of Families (Uni<ffn 
Nacional de Padres de Familia ) 
a) total membership of 500,000
C» Knights of Columbus (Caballeros de Colon) 
a) total membership 3,500 .
D. Federation of Catholic Schools (Federacion 
de Coleaios Particulares)
a) Federal District colleges and schools
b) total number 112 .
E. Legion of Decency (Legion Mexicana de la 
Decencia)
a]twenty-five members in each of the nation's 
thirty-two federative entities
F. National Association of Catholic Newspapers, 
Writers, Publishers, and Editors (ANPELEC)
a) total membership of 425
G. National Work of the Good Press (Obra Nacional 
de la Buena Prensa)f
These figures suggest why the more than 4.5 million 
Catholics, organized into expressive interest groups, cannot 
be a force ignored by the PRI. Seventy-five per cent of the 
population is continually receiving Catholic literature.
The Good Press published, in 1953, an outstanding amount:
36,971,594 Catholic literature reviews; 208,030,509 infor­
mation bulletins; 5,990,539 books and pamphlets; and 
13,248,093 other publications. In addition, The Good Press 
publishes regularly two books, eight information bulletins, 
and thirteen reviews each month.^
It is significant to note that the Church has used its 
organization and its press to fight leftist movements and 
communism. In the early 1960’s the Uni/n Nacional de Padres 
de Familia and the Accion Cat/lica Mexicana instigated
1Ibid.. pp. 292-293.
2Ibid.
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demonstrations against communism. In early 1961, mass demon­
strations flared against -Castro and approximately 12,000 people 
appeared before the Basilica to pary for Cuba.^- The Church’s 
hierarchy issued the July Declaration of Catholic Principles: 
this document warned against Communist Party membership, pos­
session of communist literature or approval of communist 
action, and threatened excommunication to those who violated 
the Declaration.2
Catholic organizations have also challenged the gov­
ernment's federal education system. On February 2, 1962,
150,000 persons, sponsored by the Unicfn Nacional de Padres 
de Familia and other anti-communist groups,paraded in 
protest to the government’s primary school compulsory text 
book program. The protestors claimed that the government 
was trying to indoctrinate students with the idea of state 
supremacy and separate the child from his family.^ Another 
rightist group, the Partido de Accidn Nacional (PAN) sup­
ported the Church on the text book issue. The PAN has often 
seemed to be the Church’s political appendage. PAN sup­
porters are strong Catholics and have selected such a man as
^"Mexico," Hispanic American Repot.t. XIV, No. 6 
(August, 1961), 481.
^Graham, ©p.. cit.. p. 108.
3"Mexico," Hispanic American Report XV. No. 2
(April, 1962), 112.
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Jos/ Gonzalez Torres, president of the Catholic lawyers as­
sociation , for their presidential candidate in the 1964
campaign.
The PAN may be profiting from the extended tendency of 
Mexicans to regard it as the main opposition party. The PAN
seems to be the focal point for what opposition there is to
the P R I . 2 The PAN has benefited from the change in electoral 
rules; it now holds twenty seats in the Chamber, Many ob­
servers maintain that this representation in Congress may 
permit and lead to debating and discussion of bills and 
resolutions'. Thus, this participation and strengthening of 
representation by opposition parties may be a factor that can 
lead to the eventual disintegration of the one party system.
Another rightist element which remains outside the party 
is business. The business and industrial groups, as mentioned 
previously, deal with government through the c/maras organ­
izations. It is common, however, for businessmen to support 
other parties such as PAN. It is known that business groups 
often finance the publication of books, articles and pam­
phlets against specific government policies.^
Although the government receives the general support 
of the newer and more progressive business groups, the older
1Ibld.
2 - Needier, “Changing the Guard in Mexico,", pp. 27-30.
q̂Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party 
Democracy,", p. 300.
-120-
conservative business groups look askance at the government’s 
active role in the promotion of industrialization. The 
conservatives feel that the government is exceeding its 
boundaries by interfering in private enterprise and view with 
fear the public sector Is- eacx>o'5tcihment uupoin the,pf.iv.ate osector.
Government control of business has increased through 
legislation, decrees, licenses, and import control. In 1961, 
Mexico's economy experienced a state of stagnation. Private 
investors became reluctant to invest and a flight of capital, 
freezing of investments, decline in production, and accumu­
lation of stock occurred as a result. The government inter­
vened to the extent that in 1962 for the first time public 
investment equalled that of private investment. Although this 
government intervention seemed necessary, the government's 
economic policy was subjected to a great amount of criticism.-̂ -
PHI and Mexican Economics 
In 1962, at the annual meeting of the Associaci^n de 
Banqueros de Mexico, Heriberto Vidales, the president of 
the businessmen’s Confederaci^n de clmaras de Comercio, 
said that the best way to attract private investment was to 
provide a propitious climate for capital. At this same 
meeting, Harold Linder, president of the Export-Import 
Bank, held that in spite of the government investments being
■̂ "Mexico," Hispanic American Report. XV, No. 4
(June, 1962), 305.
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desirable it could inhibit the flow of private capital.
Raymond Vernon viewed the stagnation of Mexican economy 
in the early sixties with concern and suggested that the un­
certainty of a multiparty system may be preferable “to the 
paralysis of single party in search of u n a n i m i t y . jt was 
felt that the past and present presidents of Mexico, by 
trying to sustain the appearance of unanimity, and by taking 
a middle of the road stand, had become fearful of taking a 
position that would offend either side, and consequently they 
had eased themselves into a political strait jacket. Vernon 
held that if the president were to take Mexican economics out 
of its present slump, he must become stronger and take steps 
that could lead to controversy. Vernon proposed the following 
solutions to the economic dilemma; (l) more public investment, 
(2) a revision of the domestic tax structure, (3) more pri­
vate investment, and (4) more foreign investment.^ (it can 
be noted that the Mexican government eventually used these 
measures.)
Although the Mexican economy came out of this stagnation 
period, problems still exist in the economic sector. Before 
businessmen can be persuaded to invest in the manufacturing 
of domestic products, a better domestic market has to be
1Ibid.
2Vernon, ojd. c i t ♦ , p. 191. 
3Ibid.. pp. 184-186.
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developed. At present two-thirds of the urban poor, the 
e.iidal farmers and the small land owners must be considered 
as outside the market for modern products.^
Price disparity and unequal distribution of income were 
considered reasons for economic stagnation and also were 
factors which resulted in the weak domestic market. In the 
last seven years, there has been a steady gain of the wealthy 
at the expense of the poor. In 1957, 4.9 per cent of the 
Mexican families received 36.6 per cent of the national 
income and by 1963, 4.8 per cent received 39.8 per cent of 
the income. In a meeting of the Convenci^n Nacional de 
Centros Patronales. the Undersecretary of Industry and 
Commerce, Hugo B. Margain, asked the delegates to overcome 
the anemia of the internal market. He urged that employers 
strengthen the purchasing power of their workers by paying 
them better wages and developing a profit-sharing program.2 
By the end of 1964, both of these measures had been taken, 
yet a notable disparity remained in the distribution of 
incomes and the consequential weakness of the internal market 
continued#
PRI and Instability 
Although the PRI’s goal is to present a harmonious 
front, it can be observed that discordant factors continue
1Ibid.
2'’Mexico,” Hispanic American Report. XVII, No. 5
(July, 1964), 399.
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to persist'and to challenge7the:>one“party supremacy.
It has been suggested that the PRI political machine
is hindered by decentralization resulting from an attempt
to pacify the demands of & pluralistic society. Criticism 
has been aimed at the political machine for its failure to 
represent the people, for too often government officials, 
seeking personal gain, have been involved in graft and 
corruption, and have placed their own interests over that 
of the people and the nation.
The interest of the nation is supposedly coterminous 
with the goals of the Revolution, but many feel that the 
goals of the Revolution are merely changed and adjusted to 
meet the pragmatic requirements of the party. It is pointed
out that the Revolution’s Constitution of 1917 is adhered to
nominally but not in actuality. Its stipulation for division 
of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches has gone unheeded, and charges have been made that 
effective suffrage has not been granted. Some feel that the 
vagueness of revolutionary goals and ideology has resulted in 
the PRI’s trying to rule over splinter groups of diverse 
interests. The argument is extended from this that the party 
will not be able to maintain its monopolistic control in a 
modernizing and pluralistic society, for new and conflicting 
interests will continue to arise and will proliferate to the 
extent that no one source can satisfy and control them.
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It is perceived by some that the disintegration of the 
party will come from within its own ranks by the breaking 
away of the sectors or by factionalism within the sectors.
Even though minor disruptions are seen within the labor and 
popular sectors, no current danger from their rebellion seems 
apparent. But the turmoil, strife and struggle that is 
presently observable within the Farm Sector represents a 
formidable threat to party stability.
Outside the party, the greatest sources of agitation 
can be found in the rightist groups. The Catholic Church, 
nominally claimed to be the church of 97 per cent of the 
Mexican people, controls through its active organizations 
and press coverage a sizeable segment of society which it 
can mobilize to support its measures. The PAN, a rightist 
and pro-clerical party, has come to be considered as the 
major opposition party in Mexican politics. Since the elec­
toral reform laws of 1964, it has acquired twenty seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies; this new access to representation 
in the legislative arena may lead to more active debate that 
could eventually culminate in organized and active opposition 
within the Congress to PRI policy. Economic stagnation in 
Mexico in the early sixties appeared as a failure of the party 
to adjust economic policy between the public and private 
investment. Even though this problem has been rectified at 
present, continued success depends on the precarious
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balancing of business and government. The problem of unequal 
income distribution and a weak internal market also remains a 
major hurdle to Mexican economic stability..
Thus, it seems, that although the PRI reigns as a 
dominant one-party system, elements of dissatisfaction and 
potential challengers do exist and pose a threat to the 
continuance and stability of the Mexican one-party system.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Mexico has progressively become a democratic country 
and is noted for its political stability among Latin 
American countries. Since 1928 the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) has been the Mexican nation's guide 
along the road of advancement and modernization. The PRI 
provides the Mexican people with an institutionalized sys­
tem through which they can channel their interests and seek 
their goals, for it acts as a means of mediation and com­
munication between the people and government. The party 
has sought to substitute peaceful transference of power 
through elections, persuasion, and compromise, for rebel­
lions, military uprisings and physical coercion which have 
so often typified the Latin American political arenas. The 
PRI, in seeking to represent the goals of the Revolution and 
the Mexican nation, has tried to incorporate the major inter­
ests of farm, labor, and the middle class, and in addition 
has also acted as a conciliator and a guide for those inter­
est groups which have chosen to remain outside of its ranks.
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The PRI has managed for thirty-six years to be the dominant 
non-dictatorial party which has been flexible enough to 
obtain the over-whelming support from the Mexican popu,lace 
and remained relatively unchallenged to continue its one 
party rule. It is the contention of this chapter that,i'
judging from the party's past and present stability, the 
PRI will continue its monopoly of the Mexican political 
system. In this concluding chapter, a final analysis of 
the party will be made which will support this view.
The PRI, as a formally organized political agency, 
provides a systematized mechanism through which functional 
groupings may adjust their conflicts and seek their goals.
The strength and lasting influence of the 
revolutionary party results in no small measure from 
the high degree (for Mexico) of cohesion it has been 
able to achieve through the interrelated devices of 
this effective sector-party machinery and the activities 
of a party leader-president who can manipulate the party 
organization, the formal agencies of government, and the 
bureaucracies of both.
Whether they be inside or:, outside the party's ranks, 
the PRI has been most successful in representing and stabi­
lizing Mexican interests. In its quest for unanimity, the 
party has walked a tightrope, taking care not to lean too 
far to the left nor too far to the right, and by this method 
of eclecticism, it has managed to represent both the progres­
sive and conservative elements of society.
^Scott, cjd. cit.. p. 175.
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The question may be raised as to whether the PRI can continue, 
in a modernizing, industrial, pluralistic society, to rep­
resent the ever-increasing diverse interests. Deutscher and 
Key in their general theory,that can be applied to one-party 
systems, think not, for they contend that urbanization and 
industrialization are elements resulting in the disinte­
gration of the one-party system. Both note that expansion 
of politically cognizant labor groups can result in faction­
alism which will lead to the termination of the one-party 
system. Many Latin American authorities recognized the pos­
sibility of the Deutscher-Key theory being applicable to the 
one-party system of Mexico.
In contrast to this school of thought are such men as 
Betrand Raul and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Although their theory 
concerns the one-party states of Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia, it does have relevance in this study of the Mexican 
one-party system. Raul and Brzezinski contend that a modern 
technological and industrial society makes it possible for 
the one-party state to become more institutionalized, thus 
insuring the continuance of a more pervading and compact 
party system. Thus it is felt by some authorities that the 
PRI gains strength as Mexico undergoes the process of modern­
ization for the PRI exists as the sole political agency whicl'i 
offers a permanent, institutionalized mechanism. Scott,-
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supports this view in the following quotation.
To put it another way, as iheir number and 
diversity grow, Mexico's proliferating functional 
interests feel a growing dependency upon those party 
mechanisms for adjusting their conflicts. It is 
neither the PRI itself nor any individual president, 
so much as the need for adjustment among the competing 
interests which both serve, that motivates interest 
associations to act within the official party or to 
accept its part in the decision-making process if they 
do not happen to belong to one of the three sectors.1
It is significant that the PRI, being aware of the 
expanding interests in society, has sought to envelop them 
within its sectors particularly through inclusion in the 
Popular Sector, essentially the sector of the middle class. 
The importance of the middle class must not go unnoticed; 
in Mexico it is the middle class which is now guiding the 
government arid the Revolution. As Mexican society increas­
ingly experiences the process of transition of modernization, 
more of its citizens are joining the ranks of the middle 
class. This middle class is seen by Scott, Needier, and 
Johnson as a factor which tends toward moderation and acts 
as a steadying influence in Mexican politics; the middle 
class, by its nature, tends towards conservatism and has sup­
ported the PRI middle-of-the-road position.
The Popular Sector, owing a great deal to its primarily 
middle class membership, has evolved into the strongest and
the most politically active of the PRI's three sectors. It
_  _____       ",  ,.
Scott, o]D. cit.. p. 175.
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is this sector which has exceeded the other two in congres­
sional representation, and because of the Popular Sector's 
containing the FSTSE, the government bureaucrat's union, it 
has been the beneficiary of government favor. It thus seems 
that the Popular Sector, receiving governmental benefits, by 
its influence and numerical strength will continue to gain 
in power and in numbers and will most likely remain in the 
ranks of the official party.
The Labor Sector appears to be a secure and steady force 
within the party structure. No major strikes have occurred 
since the 1958-1959 series grid Lopez Hateos, noted for his 
ability to deal with labor, was able to gain labor's support 
during his administration.
The government extended benefits of social security, 
old age insurance,and unemployment compensation to labor. 
Recently, in an attempt to make a more even distribution of 
income arid to strengthen the laborers' purchasing powers, 
Congress passed a law that introduced a new sharing plan 
which would permit workers to share in company profits. 
Organized labor lauded the government for its action and 
regarded this plan as the fulfillment of a long awaited dream.
Although problems have risen within the Labor Sector 
when its leaders have failed to represent it, measures have 
been taken to prevent such a reoccurrence. The CTM; and'its 
BUO groups continue to stabilize and head the Labor Sector of
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the PRI, From all signs, it seems as if Labor will continue 
to seek its objectives and solve its differences within the 
ranks of the PRI.
At present the greatest threat to the PRI’s stability 
comes from the Farm Sector which is experiencing instability 
and strife. Overpopulation, unemployment, poverty, graft 
and corruption plague the Farm Sector and cause the rural 
region to rise in protest with hunger marches and paracar- . 
distas1 demonstrations. The Lopez and the Qrdaz adminis­
trations, aware of the agrarian plight, have begun to 
emphasize agrarian reform.
The government has sought to aid the Farm Sector by 
establishing public works projects for irrigation and 
electrification, by educating the rural people to modern 
means of farm technology, by providing for a distribution of 
land on a more rational base, by opening unexploited areas 
to colonization, by seeking to rectify the unemployment 
problem by the introduction of light industry, by extension 
of credit to the e.iidos . and by eradicating corruption in 
its agrarian institutions. Thus, it can be seen that the 
government is not being idle but is constructively trying 
to resolve the dilemma of the Farm Sector.
Nevertheless, extreme poverty persists, and peasants 
often unable to see the value of the long range projects 
of the government, continue to remain dissatisfied. It is
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probable that at preseat this sector, or at least a 
major part of it, could break from the ranks of the 
official party. Yet if this sector did break away from 
the PRI, there is little fear of it forming an opposition 
party which could successfully challenge the PRI, for the 
Farm Sector, since its origin, has been the least articu­
late of the three sector organizations. And the rural area, 
although being continually exposed to modern techniques, 
still remains relatively isolated from the major impacts 
of modernization. Except for spontaneous eruptions, polit­
ical apathy and unawareness prevail among its members.
Consequently, it appears that although the Farm Sector 
is unstable and offers the greatest threat to the PRI, its 
threat |s. notegrav’e enough to disrupt the basic stability 
of the PRI. It seems as if the party machine has been suc­
cessful in securing the support of the labor and popular 
sectors. Therefore, for the present and in the foreseeable 
future, the PRI most likely will be able to escape any 
serious internal disintegration within its sectors.
The party machine has stabilized its internal structure 
by allowing democracy to function within its ranks. To date 
neither the Congress nor elections have provided an arena 
for political action. It is significant that the PRI has 
established a stage for such action within its own ranks. 
Here, through the interaction of sector representatives,
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party committees, and government officials, intra-party 
elections are held and decided, decisions are formulated, 
and compromises are made.
The PRI is becoming more democratic in its general 
make up, for it has sought to reach out and allow increasing 
participation from the grass-roots elements. The people 
have more voice in their choice of representatives, and local 
and state political bosses are becoming a part of the past. 
Disputes are generally settled by administration and law- 
enforcement, and such incidents as the Jaramillo murder arid 
the burning of El Huanal village are isolated from the 
general practice of Mexican law enforcement.
The Zapata Movement of 1962 protested that the Mexican 
people were being deprived of effective suffrage and it is 
generally admitted that the real power struggle exists in 
intra-party elections, not in the official Mexican elections. 
However, elections have begun to become more democratic. 
Opposition party candidates are allowed to campaign openly 
throughout Mexico. Elections have become more peaceful until 
in 1964 there was not a major uprising or demonstration; for 
the first time, the opposition candidate formally conceded 
the election. An effort was made in 1964 to reform the 
election laws to enable minority parties to have more op­
portunity for representation in Congress.
Because more popular participation is urged and 
increasing interests have arisen, it has been necessary
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for responsibility, in decision making, to be allocated 
among officials at the various levels of government. This 
has not been a reversion toward the system of political 
bosses, for strong, central control continues to emanate 
from the president. No official figure can remain in his 
position if he is opposed to the president’s policy, a'nd 
the president still has the power to make or break leaders 
of the interest groups.
That there is considerable overlapping in government, 
party, and sector personnel has been noted. Imputations 
have been made that often this polyfunctionalism causes 
government officials to seek personal gain at the expense 
of their sector’s interests. At times this has been true, 
but recently pressure upon sector officials, such as the 
strikes of 1958, and the newly passed labor resolution on 
labor officials which forbids them to hold a political 
position at the same time they are representing labor, seek 
to eradicate the corrupt system of old. It is important 
that, since the termination of the Aleman administration, 
Mexico has taken major strides in preventing graft and 
corruption in its politics.
Polyfunctionalism can, if it is used rightly, be 
advantageous. By choosing sector members to serve-’as party 
and government officials, men are chosen who are informed and 
are qualified to deal with the sectors’ problems. The over­
lapping and interaction have also afforded all sides a more
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direct means of communication than they would ordinarily 
have if there were no such integration.
The party’s becoming identified with the government 
has helped to make it more stable in the minds of the 
people. The PRI has become the official political party 
of the government. And through the government the PRI has 
been able to control the executive, legislative, judicial 
and administrative branches of the nation for nearly forty 
years.
During this period the PRI has also identified itself 
with the Revolution. The Almond-Verba study concluded that 
the Revolution continues to have an important psychological 
effect upon the people. They found that pride in the Mexican 
nation was dependent to a considerable extent on the PRI's 
continuing symbolic identification with the Revolution. Of 
the Mexicans interviewed in this study,65 per cent could 
name general goals of the Revolution. These goals, being 
broad and general, have remained as a national unifying 
force arid have been the basis of the party’s platform.
The party has been accused of amending the revolutionary 
goals to the extent that it has substituted its own pragmatic 
measure for the original value of the Revolution. It is to 
be pointed out that the revolutionary goals, from the begin­
ning, were ambiguous. From its inception, the party..has in­
terpreted the goals to comply with the times. It has, by 
this flexibility and adaptability, kept the revolutionary
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goals alive to act as a restraiht against excesses of 
private investment, and to stimulate social, economic, and 
political justice among the Mexican citizenry.
Charges have been levied against the PRI that it has 
abandoned the ideals of the Revolution since many have felt 
that party arid government officials have become too occuppied 
with graft and personal gain to carry out the ideal of the 
Revolution. Even though corruption exists today (notable in 
the government agrarian institutions),the Mexican govern­
ment, probably more than any other Latin American government, 
is rising above the tradition of mordida. Public officials 
such as Diaz Ordaz recognize corruption within the government 
and have taken measures to eradicate it.
The PRI’s success in its quest for unanimity extends to 
circles outside the official party. For the party is gen­
erally able to convince outside interests that since the PRI 
has the undisputable majority, a minority interest can most 
easily achieve its goal through the PRI. An example of the 
convincing manner of the PRI could be noted in the 1964 pres­
idential election when two of the three legally recognized 
opposition parties, ( the PPS and the PARM) supported and 
voted for the PRI presidential candidate.
Other opposition parties such as the extra-legal ''
/rightist parties, the Frente Patriota de Mexico, the Union 
Sinarquista, the Partido Democr/tico Cristiano. and the 
Movimiento Social Democr^tica and the extra-legal leftist
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parties, the Frente Electoral del Puebla. the Central 
Campesina and the Partido Comunista Mexicana offered nothing 
but weak and confused challenges.
The Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) helped to maintain 
its growing reputation as the main opposition party by being 
the only legally recognized party to run a presidential 
candidate in 1964. The PAN experienced a gain in its repre­
sentation in Congress by acquiring 20 seats in the Chamber; 
this , many feel, could cause Congress to regain its consti­
tutional position as a major branch of the Mexican government. 
If active debate took place in Congress, a new political 
arena would exist to which the interests of Mexico could take 
their requests and problems for settlement. At the moment, 
however, many hold that this is not likely to happen, for the 
PAN itself regards this new representation more as a honorary 
recognition rather than a means by which it could participate 
in active debate on the floor of the Congress.-*- Since the 
PRI continues to hold such a staggering majority in Congress, 
it can be assumed that even with the new method of represen­
tation, it would be unlikely for the Congress to emerge as a 
governmental branch which engages in meaningful deliberation, 
for it appears as if legislation will continue to be decided 
upon before its presentation to Congress. If opposition
’'"The writer has seen no reference to increased 
participation or engagement of opposition parties in 
Congressional debate since the new representation policy 
has been in effect.
parties did voice their complaints, the only utility in 
their -doing so would be that at least the Congress could 
be .used as a sounding board for the opposition.
The PAM has suffered from the PRI’s swing toward the 
right, and the selection of the conservative D^az Qrdaz 
served as a blow to many areas of PAN support, Qrdaz’s 
moderate, conservative and anti-communist position cut 
into the PAN vote and caused many conservatives to bolt for 
the first time from PAN ranks:to.vote for a PRI candidate. 
This recent rightist orientation of the PRI has pla­
cated the major rightist institutional organization, the 
Catholic Church. Although the Church , with its large 
membership, Catholic organizations, and press coverage, 
could muster enough strength to challenge PRI stability, 
it seems unlikely. For the present, the Church and govern­
ment seem to have agreed on a peaceful co-existence. The 
government has attempted to gain Church support by a loose 
interpretation of the Constitution's anti-clerical pro'-'. s: 
visions. The government has also become much more rightist 
and has joined the Church in its fight against communism.
The Church, too, has acquiesced by becoming more liberal.
The Papal Encyclical, Mater et Magistra. advocating social, 
economic and political justice for the laboring class, has 
become the twentieth century Bible of the Church in Mexico.
Another major rightist institution is the military.
Most authorities concur, however, that the military presents
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no threat to the Mexican government, and as a unit it is out 
of Mexican politics. It is contended that the military per­
sonnel, generally of middle-class background, tend to sympa­
thize with the PRI. Further, it is noted that often military 
personnel become affiliated in the sectors, most often within 
the Popular Sector. Business and industrial groups have 
existed outside the PRI’s organization. But through the 
special chambers, the CONCAMIN and the COjMCANCO, the PRI 
has been able to institutionalize the interrelations of gov­
ernment and business. These Ccfmaras are under the juris­
diction of the Ministry of Economy, and represent the major 
business interests of Mexico. In addition, private trade 
and commercial groups exist and seek their interests through 
the Presidential Office.
There is a division in the business community between 
the old group and the new group and disagreement is voiced 
by the two groups in relation to the amount of government 
investment that should be allowed. Although the two groups 
may differ on the degree of government investment, they both 
concur that government investment and protection is needed 
and wanted. Brandenburg’s conclusion seems correct when 
he states that ’Mexican business prefers a stable nation and 
accordingly at least passively supports the PRI and actively 
supports the government."^
1Brandenburg, "Mexico: An Experiment in One Party 
Democracy,", p. 300.
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Government and business do not compete but cooperate. It 
is the duty of the Mexican government to set the economic stage 
and business must then supplement it. Through National 
Financiers, the government has invested capital in virgin 
fields and has sought to concentrate investment where lack of 
capital has existed. The government has also joined the mixed 
companies by investing along with private Mexican and foreign 
capital. The government has aided Mexico’s private industries 
with its policies on tariffs, fixation of import controls,labor 
legislation, exemption from taxes and its extension of credit 
and subsidies.
Between the years of 1939 and 1950, an unprecedented 
growth was noted in the Mexican economy. Except for a brief 
stagnation period in the early 1960’s, the Mexican economy has 
been increasing substantially. Particularly significant was 
the fact that in 1964 the Mexican economy did not experience 
the usual and expected economic fall which occurs during pres­
idential election years, Rather, investment from private 
investors, domestic and foreign, increased. The cloak of 
confidence seemed to cover the Mexican economic scene in 1964. 
This confidence extended into 1965 with the government in­
creasing the Federal budget 11.9 per cent over its 1964 budget. 
Yet it is to be noted that shortcomings are still evident in 
the uneven distribution of national income. However, it is 
held that such measures as revision of the tax structure and 
wage sharing laws will eventually help to solve this disparity
-141-
in distribution.
Thus, one could say that although problems are present in 
Mexican economics there is a general feeling of confidence and 
a belief that future prospects for investment and production < :: 
are promising.
In conclusion, it appears as if the PRI will remain the 
dominant force in Mexican politics. The ‘elements of stability 
have set a concrete base for the continuance of the PRI and 
have prevented the rise of any opposition capable of success­
fully challenging the one party system.
One of the most significant elements of stabilization 
has been the party's own political machine. Through this 
machine, the PRI has provided an institutionalized mechanism 
through which the proliferating, functional interests of Mexico 
could channel their interests and seek their political, social 
and economic goals. In addition, this machine has provided the 
only arena where popular participation and political action 
could be found; for it is within the ranks of the party that 
the actual contests for power occur.
Equally important as the physical, mechanical structure 
of party organization has been ihefmentdl'image of ..the ..PR I 
which has been instilled in the Mexican mind. The PRI has 
succeeded in identifying itself with the government, the 
Revolution, and consequently with the goals of the Mexican 
nation. The PRI has claimed to represent all major interests 
of Mexico. The party, in its quest for unanimity, has been
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able to convince both major outside interest groups and 
opposition parties, as well as the sectors in its ranks, 
that they can best achieve their objectives by working with 
the government and party officials. Although it occasionally 
has placated extreme elements by its shifting to the far left 
and far right, the PEI has endeavored to balance the interests 
and maintain a moderate, middle of the road position. By its 
success in the balancing of such interests, the PRI has been 
allowed to govern as the unchallenged, dominating force of 
Mexican politics, and has been able to mold the Mexican nation 
into a socially, politically, and economically progressive 
country. It appears that at present and in the forseeable 
future, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional will be given 
the mandate for continued leadership of Mexico.
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